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ABSTRACT
Though individuals differ in the degree to which they are predisposed to trust or act trustworthy,
we theorize that trust-based behaviors are universally determined by the calibration of conflicting
short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs, and that these programs are calibrated by
emotions experienced personally and interpersonally. In this chapter we review both the mainstream and evolutionary theories of emotions that philosophers, psychologists, and behavioral
economists have based their work on and which can inform our understanding of trust-based
behavior regulation. The standard paradigm for understanding emotions is based on mapping their
positive and negative affect valence. While Valence Models often expect that the experience of
positive and negative affect is interdependent (leading to the popular use of bipolar affect scales),
a multivariate “recalibrational” model based on positive, negative, interpersonal, intrapersonal,
short-sighted and long-sighted dimensions predicts and recognizes more complex mixed-valence
emotional states. We summarize experimental evidence that supports a model of emotionallycalibrated trust regulation and discuss implications for the use of various emotion measures.
Finally, in light of these discussions we suggest future directions for the investigation of emotions
and trust psychology.
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I. EMOTIONS AND RATIONALITY: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THOUGHT
Emotions are transient feelings that orchestrate physiological and cognitive systems
for the purpose of predisposing those who feel them to act more or less in a certain way
(Gómez-Miñambres and Schniter, 2013). Emotions play important roles in recalibrating our
propensity to trust and act trustworthy (reciprocate upon being trusted), a topic that has been
of interest to philosophers, psychologists, and economists. However, when their function and
practical design is not well understood, emotions may appear as flawed cognitive and
behavioral traits that interfere with rationality (Rand, 1964; Scherer, 1984; Elster, 1995;
Parrott, 1995). For more than 2000 years, western philosophers (and more recently
psychologists) 1 have suggested that emotions affect judgment, either working with or
conflicting with reason. Damasio (2005) has dubbed the more common and traditional belief,
that rationality and emotion are separate and opposing forces, “Descarte’s Error”. We refer
readers to Haidt (2001),2 King (2010),3 and Callahan (1988)4 who have reviewed in greater
detail this history of philosophical thought about emotions and rationality.
The philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) founded utility theory, where
happiness is understood as the predominance of "pleasure" over "pain". During the 19th
century, economists of the “marginal revolution” (e.g., William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger,
Marie-Esprit-Léon Walras, Alfred Marshall) started to consider the concept of utility to be
directly quantifiable. By using the “quantity of feeling” concept, it was possible to understand
a rational human action as the one that maximized utility specifically defined by happiness
maximization and the reduction of suffering. In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern presented a normative account of rational decision making with their axiomatic
utility function: an ordinal and stable representation of preference relations. Under this
(neoclassical) notion of rationality the individual is an automaton with stable preferences that
should pursue the best alternatives by integrating all relevant information and then comparing
the costs and benefits of all outcomes, ultimately choosing the option with highest utility.

1

Hellenistic Greeks (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Seneca), Medieval Christians (e.g., St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas,
William of Ockham), 17 th century's continental rationalists (e.g., Gottfried Leibniz, Rene Descartes), 18 th century
Scottish philosophers (e.g. David Hume, Adam Smith), 19 th century psychoanalysts (e.g. Sigmund Freud), 19 th and
20th century psychologists (e.g., William James, Walter Cannon), and 20 th century contemporary moral philosophers
(e.g. James Rachels, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.) have all argued that emotions affect judgment.
2
Haidt (2001, p.815) wrote, “Plato's Timaeus (4th century B.C./1949) presents a charming myth in which the gods
first created human heads, with their divine cargo of reason, and then found themselves forced to create seething,
passionate bodies to help the heads move around in the world. The drama of human moral life was the struggle of
the heads to control the bodies by channeling the bodies' passions toward virtuous ends. The stoic philosophers took
an even dimmer view of the emotions, seeing them as conceptual errors that bound one to the material world and
therefore to a life of misery (R. C. Solomon, 1993). Medieval Christian philosophers similarly denigrated the
emotions because of their link to desire and hence to sin. The 17th century's continental rationalists (e.g., Leibniz,
Descartes) worshiped reason as much as Plato had, hoping to model all of philosophy on the deductive method
developed by Euclid.”
3
King (2010, p.169) described Augustine (in City of God) adopting “Stoic terminology, often calling the emotions
‘disturbances’ or ‘upheavals’ (perturbationes) when not using the neutral ‘affections’ (affectiones) or the Peripatetic
‘passions’ (passiones), and agrees with the Stoics that emotions are often contrary to reason and upset the mind…”
4
Callahan (1988, p.9) quoted Joel Feinberg’s (March 26, 1982) Presidential Address to the American Philosophical
Association in Sacramento, California, “arguments are one thing, sentiments another, and nothing fogs the mind so
thoroughly as emotion.”
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Emotional experiences triggered by past outcomes and capable of calibrating future choices,
are absent from this notion of utility.
If decision makers were actually like Laplacian demons,5 with perfect information
for forecasting others’ behavior and always capable of making the best choices (by accurately
evaluating all possible cost-benefit tradeoffs), there would be little value to the pre-decision
persuasions or ex-post feedbacks that emotions can provide. Yet, it is rarely the case that we
have enough information, mental resources, or time to evaluate all outcomes when presented
with a decision task (Simon, 1987; Todd, 2001; Slovic et al., 2002). In fact, many decision
tasks are made in the absence of complete relevant information.
Under the proposed recalibrational theory of emotions, emotions affect the decision
maker’s judgment at a particular point in time. Introducing emotions in a utility function does
not break with the original concept of utility (i.e., the decision maker tries to maximize
“pleasure” and minimize “pain”). However, in contrast with the axiomatic representation of
rationality, a utility function that incorporates emotions would be neither ordinal (the
magnitude of utility differences between different options could be relevant) nor stable
(emotions created today could affect our decisions tomorrow).
We propose that emotions serve to recalibrate behavior regulation programs 6 and are
triggered when uncertain decision outcomes are finally realized. The ex-post feedback (and
affective forecasts) that emotions provide, and their ability to recalibrate both self and others
to improve conditions, contributes to an experience-based learning and recalibration process
that is useful when taking advantage of opportunities in uncertain environments. Without the
ability to update our behavior regulation programs based on this feedback, we might
repeatedly set ourselves up for failure where a more socially appropriate or economically
viable strategy could be substituted.
Despite the appeal of functional explanations, emotions may appear as flaws of
human nature that interfere with rationality (Sherer, 1984; Elster, 1995), especially when
descriptions divorce them from their applications. However, if properly contextualized, we
can see more clear evidence for the specially designed recalibrational functions of specific
emotions. When known dilemmas are re-encountered and the effects of past emotional
experiences (previously triggered by those dilemmas) are integrated into a decision calculus
(e.g., Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Schniter, Sheremeta & Shields, 2013), contextualized learning
occurs. As such, emotions which arise after trust-based interaction outcomes are not flaws,
but instead helpful tools that recalibrate self and others, better informing future decision
processes and ultimately contributing to the cultivation of wisdom and self-control
(Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006; Gómez-Miñambres & Schniter,

5

“Laplace's demon” is how later literature referred to (and elaborated the hypothetical extension of omniscience
upon) the first argument for causal or scientific determinism by Pierre-Simon Laplace in 1814. For example, Chase,
Hertwig, & Gigerenzer (1998, p. 207) explained that Laplacian demons are all-knowing agents with minds like
super-calculators “with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational power”.
6
“Programs”, from computational science, refers to neural circuits in the brain and body which process input
information and accordingly cause outputs either in the form of regulatory variables and feedback (reused as input
by programs) or behavior.
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2013). We caution, as did Simon (1985),7 against the tendency towards decontextualizing
psychological and behavioral propensities (e.g. emotions) and thus thinking of them as
inherently “irrational”.
In this chapter, we take an adaptationist perspective based on the assumption that the
mind is best understood not as a general purpose computer, but as containing a multitude of
evolved mechanisms designed through a process of natural selection to each solve particular
subsets of recurrent problems faced by our ancestors. Different adaptive problems have
required different and unique solutions (Barrett, 2005) and emotions appear to be coordinated
systems of responses that have been selected for over evolutionary history because they
increased individual and perhaps even group fitness by solving specific problems (Plutchik,
1980; Frank, 1988; Nesse, 1990; Panskepp, 1996; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000) such as
maximizing opportunism and cultivating cooperative trust-based relationships. After
reviewing various approaches to the classification of emotions based on their similarities, we
introduce the recalibrational theory of emotions with specific attention to how emotions are
involved in the regulation of trust-based behaviors.

II. SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES TO THINKING ABOUT EMOTIONS
A. Emotion taxonomies
Taxonomy (from the Ancient Greek: taxis, 'order', or 'arrangement' and nomos,
'science') is the science of classifying parts of a whole according to units (taxa) in which parts
are grouped together based on one or more shared unique characteristics. Explicitly or
implicitly, many theorists have taken a taxonomic approach to organizing and understanding
emotions in terms of types or components. Some have proposed classes of emotions such as
“knowledge emotions” (e.g., interest, confusion, and surprise), “self-conscious emotions”
(e.g., pride, shame, and embarrassment), or “energy and effort regulating emotions” (e.g.,
malaise, nausea, and shock). Others have decomposed emotions into noteworthy components
by which they can be meaningfully classified,
“such as facial, vocal, and postural expressions (an expressive component); a subjective
feeling state (a subjective component); a set of cognitive appraisals that bring about the
emotion (a cognitive component); a tendency to act (a behavioral component); and changes in
the brain and body (a physiological component).” (Silvia, 2009, p.49)

7

Simon (1985, p. 297) wrote: “We may deem behavior irrational because, although it serves some particular
impulse, it is inconsistent with other goals that we may deem more important. We may deem it irrational because
the actor is proceeding on incorrect facts or ignoring whole areas of relevant facts. We may deem it irrational
because the actor has not drawn the correct conclusions from the facts. We may deem it irrational because the actor
has failed to consider important alternative courses of action. If the action involves the future, as most action does,
we may deem it irrational because we don’t think the actor uses the best methods for forming expectations or for
adapting to uncertainty. All of these forms of irrationality play important roles in the lives of every one of us, but I
think it is misleading to call them irrationality. They are better viewed as forms of bounded rationality.”
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It is over these qualifying aspects of emotions that theorists have busied themselves
quibbling about and declaring what constitutes an emotion. Given the lack of consensus over
a definition, many basic questions are often repeated about emotions: How intense must a
feeling be felt to qualify as an emotion? When lasting too long, are they no longer emotions
but moods? Or, must they be consciously felt at all (must there be first-person awareness of
them) to be considered emotions?
In a seminal text entitled “What is an emotion?” William James (1884) introduced
what is now called the James–Lange theory of emotion8 by famously asking the question: do
we run from a bear because we are afraid or are we afraid because we run? James was
convinced that we experience fear of the bear because we (first) see it and run. In the
processes of reacting to what we see (e.g. by running), the experiences of adaptive lifepreserving bodily reactions associated with predator evasion (e.g., increased blood pressure,
racing heart, perspiration, heightened awareness, and quick movements) are perceived as a
feeling, or set of feelings, to which we assign an emotion label. Similarly, other kinds of
responses to adaptive problem situations result in salient physiological experiences. Each
unique combination of sensory feedback for a given type of response or reaction, therefore,
can be assigned an identifying label – which the English language has plenty of (e.g.,
Averill’s (1975) Semantic Atlas of Emotional Concepts lists 558 words for emotions), despite
being unable to completely label all emotions that humans experience.9 James argued that it is
these identifying labels of unique physiological experiences that we call emotions. Arguments
that emotions are effective because they are felt have been more recently proposed by
Damasio's (1994) "somatic marker hypothesis", which argues that emotions are (initially)
sensed corporally more than mentally10 and by Zeelenberg et al. (2008) who suggested that
the effectiveness of emotions comes from the fact that they are “felt” hedonically.
A general criticism made of the James–Lange theory of emotion (e.g. by Damasio,
2004, p.10) has argued that visceral changes alone “are insufficiently differentiated to provide
8

James is one of the two namesakes of the James–Lange theory of emotion, which he formulated independently
of Carl Lange in the 1880s (see also Lang’s original formulation in the 1885 work On Emotions: A PsychoPhysiological Study). The James–Lange theory of emotion is an intuitively appealing idea because intuitions about
emotions are generally rooted in the thoughts or feelings that people are consciously aware of. Nevertheless,
insights from psychology and cognitive science have provided reason to caution against exclusive reliance on
intuitive appeal as a justification for formulating cognitive models. An oft-quoted principle of evolutionary
psychology thus states: “Consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg; most of what goes on in your mind is hidden
from you. As a result, your conscious experience can mislead you into thinking that our circuitry is simpler that it
really is.” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997)
9
The Japanese have the word “amae” for the satisfaction that is felt when one is humbled before their benefactors
and those more dominant or senior to them, and another word “oime” for feeling indebted, neither of which English
speakers have (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). For further discussion of universal versus culturally-specific emotions
see Wierzbicka (1986).
10
Damasio (2004) suggests that somatic markers act as pre-decision “gut feeling” forecasts of hypothetical
outcomes (and, in turn, emotional feelings are triggered by recognition/thought of these). In doing so, somatic
markers (which Hume called “passions”) provide decision makers a limited and manageable set of alternatives to
consider (as opposed to the full spectrum of possibilities – which due to its enormity presents a frame problem (see
de Sousa, 1994)), when engaging their reason (i.e., by making logic-based cost-benefit analyses). Ketelaar and Todd
(2001) also describe emotion as a simple mechanism that might “help us surmount the frame problem”. Note also
that Hume’s earlier words on the matter seemed to say much the same about passions preceding and informing
reason: ‘‘Reason is, and ought only be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
and obey them” (1740/1978, book II, part III, section III, p. 415).
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a specific basis for the different emotions…they are unusually confined to measures of heart
rhythm, respiration, skin conductance and temperature, and blood pressure”. Along with the
experience of physiological changes (reactions), what has come to be known as the
Schachter–Singer theory (1962) states that, in addition to corporeal biofeedback, we also need
cognitive input (Barrett (2006) specifically suggested context, prior experience, and social
cues) about what is being reacted to in order to properly interpret, and thus label our
emotional experiences.11 An alternative definition of emotions as “situation detecting
algorithms” which trigger physiological and cognitive states (whether or not deliberative),
lends itself, as suggested by Tooby and Cosmides (2008), to consider the inclusion of nonconscious states such as coma 12 that would be precluded by standard definitions of emotion
that require a conscious experience.
Focusing more on how the organism is prepared to deal with problems (via
purposeful actions) or to communicate its state to other organisms (via muscular movements),
Darwin (1872/1965) classified emotions according to the basic postures, physiological
aspects, and facial expressions associated with them. Darwin argued that many of the
emotions he studied (e.g. despair, anger, disgust, guilt, pride, shame) must be universal to
humans and, because of homologues found in non-human mammals, must share
evolutionarily deep phylogenetic roots. A century later, cross-cultural studies of emotional
expressions and their identification (e.g., see Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 1972;
Izard, 1977),13 neuropsychological studies (Lawrence & Calder, 2004),14 and phylogenetic
studies of emotion homologues (e.g., see Griffiths, 1997; Panskepp, 1998) have provided
empirical support for Darwin’s early insights that emotions are adaptations.
Following Darwin’s lead, we take an etiological approach, considering emotions’
ultimate adaptive functions (that is, what they are designed to do). Regarding their more
proximate functions (that is, how they do what they do), we defer to the detailed
11

Cannon (1927) argued that the same visceral responses such as increased heart rate, sweating, widening of the
pupils, and the discharge of adrenaline can be associated with either the experience of fear or anger. However, the
same visceral responses are also connected to conditions such as fever, feeling cold, and having difficulty breathing.
In a famous study, Schachter and Singer (1962) injected college students with epinephrine (although all participants
were told that they were given a new drug called "Suproxin" to test their eyesight). The study showed that
depending on small contextual changes, equal doses of the drug could variably result (due either to manipulations or
absence of manipulations) in experienced states of euphoria, anger, or amusement. Therefore, as suggested earlier
by Cannon and others, physical responses (alone) are insufficient for identifying specific emotions.
12
Tooby and Cosmides (2008, p.129-130) wrote that, “when situation-detecting algorithms detect the presence of a
very grave internal injury, or the potential for one as indicated by a major blow, these may trigger a mode of
operation of the psychological architecture that is designed to prevent any discretionary movement: coma. The
function of coma, in a world before hospitals, was to prevent further injury from being done, minimize blood loss
and internal hemorrhaging, and allow the mobilization of the body’s resources toward repair of immediate threats to
life. Note that a coma is not a physically mandated state of paralysis; it is a computational state—technically, ‘a
state of unconsciousness from which the patient cannot be roused’ (Miller, 1976, p. 46), or ‘unarousable
unresponsiveness’ (Berkow, 1992, p. 1398).”
13
In various studies Paul Ekman, Wallace Friesen, Phoebe Elsworth, Carroll Izard and others found that either
posed photographs or videos of facial expressions of basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and
surprise) from Westerners (who have been exposed to media depictions of emotions – a potential confound) and
from preliterate non-Westerners (with no previous exposure to mass-media) could be accurately decoded within and
between groups (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 1972, Izard, 1977; Ekman, 1992).
14
Examining evidence from cognitive deficits on task performance, Lawrence and Calder (2004) found
neuropsychological evidence for three dissociable emotion systems: fear, disgust, and anger. Their evidence
suggests that these emotion systems are isolable, specialized, and internally cohesive.
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psychophysiological studies which clearly show that neural, hormonal, circulatory, and
muscular mechanisms are intricately involved in dissociable sets of emotional reactions.
Levenson (1994, p.123) suggested that,
“Psychologically, emotions alter attention, shift certain behaviors upward in response
hierarchies, and activate relevant associative networks in memory. Physiologically, emotions
rapidly organize the responses of disparate biological systems including facial expression,
somatic muscular tonus, voice tone, autonomic nervous system activity, and endocrine activity
to produce a bodily milieu that is optimal for effective response.”

Similarly, Cosmides and Tooby (2000, p. 93) suggested that an emotion can orchestrate
competing programs (an ultimate function) via its proximate “effects on physiology,
behavioral inclinations, cognitive appraisals, or feeling states, because it involves evolved
instructions for all of them together, as well as other mechanisms distributed throughout the
human mental and physical architecture.”
In the next section we review the notion of affect valence and propose that the
emotions we consider facilitate behavioral regulation because they provide either positive or
negative affective feedback (experienced as pleasant and unpleasant feelings) that is used in
updating the calibration of one’s conflicting internal regulatory variables (Tooby &
Cosmides, 1990, 2008). As Lerner and Keltner (2000, p.475) have explained, “Valence-based
approaches face one obvious shortcoming, however. They fail to specify whether different
emotions of the same valence differentially influence judgments and choices.” After
identifying some of the shortcomings of modeling emotions in terms of valence alone, we
discuss the distinction between intrapersonal emotions that may affect reinforcement,
maintenance, or change of one’s own behavior, and interpersonal emotions that may
ultimately affect reinforcement, maintenance, or change of another’s behavior.

B. Positive and negative emotions
1. Hedonism, utility, and affect valence. An epistemology of emotions understood
according to a single positive–negative dimension of affective experience traces its roots back
to the ancient philosophy of hedonism formalized a little over 2000 years ago. More recently,
during the past 100 years, hedonist philosophy has been integrated into mainstream academia.
Hedonism, which traces back to Sumerian civilization,15 Ancient Egypt,16 Ancient
17
India, and Ancient Greece (Democritus,18 Aristippus19 and later Epicurus20), is a school of
15

In the original Old Babylonian version of the Epic of Gilgamesh, written briefly after the invention of
writing, Siduri gave the following advice: "Fill your belly. Day and night make merry. Let days be full of joy.
Dance and make music day and night", which may represent the first recorded advocacy of a hedonistic
philosophy.” (Sandars, 1972)
16
Hedonistic scenes of musicians providing entertainment for guests at feasts have been found in ancient
Egyptian tombs. A common interpretation for the revelry depicted has been that these pleasures were indulged and
indulgence was encouraged in this world, because the afterlife provided no such pleasures.
17
The Cārvākas school of thought (600 BC-14th century AD) maintained a naturalistic worldview, arguing against
the idea of an afterlife as described by Hindu scriptures and priests. The Cārvākas argued that nothing is wrong with
sensual indulgence, and given no afterlife, pleasure should be the aim of living.
18
Democritus (370 BC) seems to be the earliest philosopher on record to have categorically embraced a hedonistic
philosophy; he called the supreme goal of life "contentment" or "cheerfulness", claiming that "joy and sorrow are
the distinguishing mark of things beneficial and harmful" (DK 68 B 188 – Taylor, 2005, p125).
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thought arguing that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. More recently, the academic “fields”
of aesthetic psychology,21 psychobiology, and psychology of emotion have developed their
understanding of emotions according to a positive-negative affect valence, while economists
and cognitive psychologists have developed their understanding of choice preference and
rational behavior (and the influence of emotions on choice) by identifying utility22 as a
cardinal measure of pleasure derived from a desirable outcome. However, the question of
why some people find some outcomes aversive while others find them attractive, is a puzzle
that has classically been avoided: De gustibus non est disputandum.23 Never the less, it has
been widely noted that the valenced affective nature of how we each experience things, in
turn affects how we are each inclined to further experience things or avoid experiencing
things.24 Or, in the parlance of economists, our emotions assign subjective “utilities” to the
options available to us based on the pleasure they give us and the pleasures they give others.25
As a result of this history of thought, the standard model used in the social sciences to
understand emotions is based on the fundamentals of affect valence. While we also base our
model of emotions on positive and negative dimensions, we argue that a deeper understanding
of patterned emotional response can be achieved by considering additional intrapersonal,

19

The Cyrenaics (named after Cyrene, the birthplace of founder Aristippus) were an ultra-hedonist Socratic school
of philosophy founded in the 4th century BCE. The Cyrenaics taught that the only intrinsic good is pleasure, which
meant not just the absence of pain, but positively enjoyable sensations.
20
Epicurus (307 BC) taught a form of hedonism which is now referred to as Epicureanism. Epicureanism declares
pleasure to be linked to achieving an intrinsic good, and that pleasure and pain are the measures of what is good and
evil. Epicurus also recognized the importance of living modestly, not over-indulging in pleasurable things, and
practicing moderation to achieve tranquility.
21
Silvia (2009, pp.48-49) summarized some notable achievements in the domain of aesthetic and emotion
psychology: “Henry Rutgers Marshall's (1894) classic—Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics—accurately captures his
unidimensional model of aesthetics. By the time of Kate Gordon's (1909) Esthetics—perhaps the first textbook in
psychological aesthetics—the positive–negative dimension of affective experience was well established. Much
later, Berlyne (1960, 1971) developed a sophisticated behavioral theory based on reward and aversion systems. The
success of Berlyne's approach ensured a long life for research on positive and negative aesthetic feelings. As
Berlyne (1971) and his group were conducting their landmark experiments, the psychology of emotion was
emerging as an interdisciplinary field (Izard, 1971).”
22
In economics, utility is understood to be ordinal and cardinal. It has been proposed that utility is experienced and
even measurable as hedonic utility – in terms of units of positive and negative affect (i.e., emotional experience that
is pleasurable or aversive). This notion was introduced into classical economics by Bentham (1948) and has been
revisited in modern behavioral economics (Kahneman et al., 1997). Standard behavioral models in contemporary
economics have been based on the notion of “Max-U”, that given a choice among alternatives, people will choose
the action that maximizes measured utility (though see critical discussion by McCloskey, 2006). Smith and Wilson
(2013, p.3) argue that the legacy of “Max-U” is widespread in economics: “Utility preference functions perform
heavy duty work in modeling a vast range of human decisions: isolated individuals in psychophysical
measurements, individuals choosing among uncertain probabilistic prospects, interactive agents in supply-anddemand auction and asset markets, and individuals interacting through choices in two-person (e.g., trust) games or
in small groups (public good and common property games).”
23
Merriam Webster dictionary defines De gustibus non est disputandum (2013) as a Latin maxim meaning "In
matters of taste, there can be no disputes", or literally, "There must not be debate concerning tastes".
24
Later, in the development of economic thought, game theory matured from a focus on a money-maximizing selfinterested agent’s utility function to a focus on an agent’s utility function based on an admixture of self-interest and
“other-regarding” interest (e.g. Cox et al., 2007). In turn, notions of emotional contributions to utility maximizing
functions also matured.
25
Adam Smith introduced this notion in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and also went on to specify (1759, p.13)
that most humans experienced a “Pleasure of mutual Sympathy” when they experience the “fellow feeling” of
sharing the same emotions with others (and feel a pain when they do not share the same emotions).
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interpersonal, short-sighted and long-sighted dimensions (which we elaborate on in the
sections below).
In contemporary discussions of emotions, affect valence refers to the intrinsic
attraction (positive valence) or aversion (negative valence) that one’s feelings (emotions)
associate with an event, object, or situation (Fridja, 1986, p. 207). Being positive and
negative, emotions facilitate behavioral regulation because they provide recalibrational
feedback that we and others (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides, 2008) have argued is used in updating
the weighting of one’s internal regulatory variables. Pleasant and unpleasant feelings,
experienced as consequences of past actions or interactions, serve as either fundamental
incentives or disincentives to motivate change from previous behavioral calibrations. To
achieve this, pleasant feelings are rewarding and incentivize approach behavior (Watson et
al., 1999) or future continuation of the prior behavior or interaction that triggered them
(Carver & Scheier, 1990). Unpleasant feelings are costly and motivate a change (Gray, 1971),
whether through down-regulated behavior, avoidance, or aggression.
In accord with affect-as-information (Ketelaar, 2006; Ketelaar & Au, 2003) and
benefit appraisal (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b) approaches, positive emotions (in so far
as their outputs are experienced consciously as affective states) indicate potential fitness
benefits, while negative emotions indicate potential fitness costs. These categories of positive
and negative emotions have been shown to be cross-culturally (e.g., Lutz, 1982; Osgood et
al., 1975; Russell, 1983) interpreted by those experiencing them in desirability terms – valued
as “good” or “bad”, respectively.
Given the fundamental structure that the valence dimension factors onto emotion
(Higgins, 1997), it is unsurprising that psychophysiologists (Driscoll, Tranel, & Anderson
2009; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm 1993) neuroscientists (Proverbio, Zani, & Adorni
2008; Screenivas, Boehm, & Linden 2012) behavioral economists (Morretti & di Pellegrino
2010; Brandts, Riedl, & van Winden 2009; Van den Berg, Dewitte, & Warlop 2008; Morris
1995) and decision scientists (Hogarth, Portell, Cuxart, & Kolev 2011; Reid & GonzalezVallejo 2009; Schlosser, Dunning, & Fetchenhauer 2013) have used and continue to use
bipolar affect scales. Below we argue that these scales are overly simplistic. One of the most
popular among the affect scales (and used by all the above mentioned researchers) is the SelfAssessment-Manikin (SAM)26 scale (see Figure 1), which can be used to study people’s
emotional states, for example, following decisions and interactions.

26

SAM scales were introduced and developed by Lang (1980), Lang et al. (1999) as quick, cheap, and easy
nonverbal methods of quantifying subjective feeling states (e.g., valence) that are not be subject to age (Backs et al.,
2005), verbal (Bradley & Lang, 1994) or cultural (Morris, 1995) factors. The Valence scale also exists as a portrait
version as first used by Suk (2006). Touted in defense of their “validity”, ratings along the SAM predict
physiological reactions like skin conductance, heart rate, and facial electro-myographic measurement (Bradley,
Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Güntekin & Basar, 2007; for further validation data see Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 1997) – however, because (as we have already discussed) positive affective states may accompany the
same physiological traits as negative affective states (e.g. euphoria and anger) – the correlation of positive and
negative affect with physiological effects is unremarkable.

10

Eric Schniter and Timothy Shields

Figure 1. Self-Assessment-Manikin scale. Participants are required to choose one of five
(or in another version one of nine) images to represent their emotional state.
2. Mixed emotional states and surprise as an emotion. Previous work (Schniter,
Sheremeta, & Shields, 2013) has identified two limitations to relying exclusively on bipolar
affect scales: first, mixed emotional states (with simultaneous experience of both positive and
negative affects like triumph, a positive emotion, and guilt, a negative emotion) are common
and cannot be well represented by scales based on a simplistic positive-negative affect
dimension alone, and second, some emotions (e.g., surprise, discussed below) are not
exclusively positive or negative.
Dilemmas involve basic tradeoffs between pursuits of mutually exclusive (yet
individually attainable) goals. This definition holds true whether considering self-control
dilemmas (e.g. Gómez-Miñambres & Schniter, 2013), where indulgence and restraint are
traded off, or social dilemmas (where opportunism and cooperation are traded off). Because a
dilemma presents a decision maker with two (exclusive) available goals, we conjecture that
the presence of a dilemma simultaneously activates competing programs. In support of this,
neural imaging studies have provided confirmation of dual programs simultaneously
activating in subjects exposed to decision dilemmas (McClure et al. 2004; Hare et al. 2009).
After a decision has been made as to how to behave in the face of a dilemma, the
decision outcome, whether “successful” or not (from the goal achievement perspective of
each of the competing programs), may result in a mix of both positive and negative emotions
(Cacciopo et al., 1999). Hume (1978/1740) described how the opposing passions of desire
and aversion are exacerbated by dilemmas and can appear as “disorders”: “For ‘tis observable
that an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and produces
more disorder, than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force. …The same effect
follows whether the opposition arises from internal motives or external obstacles…” (Hume
1978/1740, book II, part III, section III, p. 415, 421) While the experience of mixed emotions
has been evoked with wins and losses in the laboratory (Larsen et al., 2001, 2004), it has been
little appreciated in the context of trust psychology. We believe mixed emotions have
received little attention, generally, because as Hume suggested, they challenge our intuitions
of singular internal interests and the consonance of a non-contradictory self-representation
generally attributed to a sane mind. Kurzban (2012, p.56) suggested the alternative to be
grappled with when adopting a modular perspective of ourselves,
“if it’s true that your brain consists of many, many little modules with various functions, and if
only a small number of them are conscious, then there might not be any particular reason to
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consider some of them to be “you” or “really you” or your “self”... And for that matter, there
might be no particular reason to consider your intuitions about your choices, or your ability to
know your “self” reliably.”

History has demonstrated that valence (typically considered to be either exclusively
positive or exclusively negative) is the most intuitive criterion used in defining an emotion.
As such, the simplest and most basic (Tellegen et al., 1999) taxonomy proposed for emotions
has long been based on valence: emotions are either positively valenced or negatively
valenced. Surprise, which has been viewed as both positively and negatively valenced, breaks
with this formal definition of what constitutes an emotion. For this reason, surprise does not
conform to a bipolar valence dimension and has been either excluded from lists of basic
emotions (e.g. see Ortony et al., 1988, pp. 32 &125–127; Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, p. 56), relegated
to an exclusively “positive” valenced assignment,27 or else included in special categories of
emotions like “knowledge emotions” (Silvia, 2009). Other emotions, also concerned with
attention and ruminations, 28 that do not conform well to a undimensional valence criterion
have also received similar treatment. Silvia (2009, p. 49) suggested that knowledge emotions,
“stem from people's appraisals of what they know, what they expect to happen, and what they
think they can learn and understand. [In turn they] … motivate learning, thinking, and
exploring, actions that foster the growth of knowledge.” According to this account,
“incongruity creates surprise”.
We propose that the functional account of surprise being capable of both positive and
negative valence, contingent on the nature of the adaptive problem triggering it, makes sense.
Casti (1994, p. ix) elaborated:
“When the rules of reality generating events of daily life separate from the rules of thumb
expectations, surprise is the outcome. …Surprise represents the difference between
expectations and reality, the gap between our assumptions and expectations about worldly
events and the way that those events actually turn out. In essence, surprises are the end result
of predictions that fail.”

In this chapter, we consider how twenty of the emotions frequently surveyed by
researchers (e.g. as part of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS)), and relevant to
the regulation of trust-based behaviors, fit into functionally unique taxa. Because surprise
may be either positively or negatively valenced, for example following a trust-based
interaction, it is in a unique taxon based on this feature (and does not get included in some of
our analyses of positive and negative emotions). The effects of surprise, as such, on
competing short-sighted and long-sighted programs (we describe these in greater detail in the
next section below) could be either positive (encouraging) or negative (discouraging). For
example, an Investor who has invested in another – trusting in expectation of the other acting
in a trustworthy manner , only to discover that the Trustee has acted opportunistically (e.g. by
not returning the investment, but instead keeping it), will be “surprised” (in this case,
negatively so). We believe that this negative surprise will act to calibrate (downregulating the
27

Surprise has been among the “positive” emotions included in some versions of the Positive and Negative Affect
Scale (e.g. see the PANAS-X by Watson & Clark, 1999).
28
Examples of emotions not conforming to a unidimensional Valence Model include coma, thrill, vigilance,
saudade, nostalgia, and confusion.
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relative power of) the long-sighted (pro-cooperation) program that was responsible for the
(failed) trust-based investment. An Investor who was negatively surprised by a failed trustbased investment should, according to this theory, be less likely to trust in the future.
Alternatively, consider a Trustee in a trust game who has been invested in despite
expecting no investment. Despite his previous expectation of non-trust by the Investor, this
Trustee is “surprised” (in this case, positively so) to learn that the Investor’s long-sighted
(pro-cooperation) program was actually relatively powerful (outweighing the competing
short-sighted pro-opportunism program), leading to the trust-based transfer. According to our
theory, the surprised Trustee’s long-sighted program will be upregulated, making him even
more likely to cooperate with the other in similar trust-based exchanges. In the next section,
before elaborating on the recalibrational functions suggested for the twenty emotions that we
have studied following trust based interactions, we develop our theory of recalibrational
emotions and the regulation of trust-based behaviors.

C. Recalibrational emotions
1. Short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs. The recalibrational theory
of emotions (Schniter et al., 2013) hinges on a cognitive model including short-sighted and
long-sighted programs that each respond to fundamental adaptive problems. Internally
conflicting programs with emotions as their co-evolved “guidance systems” may have been
selected for because they can provide efficient solutions to the dynamic problems of changing
environments (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Livnat & Pippenger, 2006). Human society has
presented itself as a recurrent selection pressure with features of constant change: on larger
social scales whole social groups may oscillate between periods of propensity towards
peaceful cooperation and war (Pinker, 2011) while on smaller social scales an individual’s
exchange partners might be engaged in Machiavellian manipulations by alternating between
tendencies to cooperate and defect (Humphrey, 1976; Byrne & Whiten, 1988). It is this
uncertainty in human social relationships which has presented a fundamental adaptive
problem.
Over the course of human evolutionary history, interactions with specific others were
likely followed up by further interactions with those same individuals due to their expected
location (Krasnow et al., 2013) and social ties.29 Due to the likelihood of repeat interactions,
the problem of entering into and maintaining iterated asynchronous exchange relationships
presented our ancestors with a selection pressure. Those more capable of cooperating in
society, presumably outcompeted those less capable of cooperation, due to the risk-buffering
benefits which they derived (e.g. see Sugiyama & Sugiyama 2003; Sugiyama 2004). Thus, it
is hypothesized that the highly social and cooperative lifestyle, which characterizes our
human ancestry (Sahlins, 1972; Isaac, 1978), led to selection for a long-sighted, pro-social
program producing favorable social norms through the use of social emotions and morals.
29

Among hunter-gatherers, who subsist, organize, and socialize much like our human ancestors did for more than
99% of human history, most interactions are frequent, among people known and related by blood or marriage (e.g.
see Hill et al., 2011), and organized into a three-generational family structure (Kaplan et al., 2009). In extant forager
populations, the human family continues to be a principal nexus of resource exchange (Kelly, 1983).
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Consistent with this hypothesis, research has shown that humans are capable of developing
and tracking reputations in iterated reciprocity relationships (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981;
Cosmides & Tooby, 1989; Kaplan et al., 2012) and capable of exchanging scarce and
valuable resources within small-scale subsistence societies (Kaplan et al., 1985; Hawkes et
al., 1991; Gurven, 2004).
According to our theory, long-sighted programs are designed to pursue the promise
of risk-buffering benefits, provided over the long-term, by preferring the pursuit of reliable
reciprocal exchange relationships and investments over immediate rewards, and by preferring
a form of social behavior that conforms to ethical and moral standards and does not offend
others and thus facilitates cooperative relationships. In calculating the promise of long-term
rewards from exchange relationships or investments, long-sighted programs concern
themselves with demonstrable reputations (social investments) of trust and trustworthiness
and norm-adherence. These long-term cooperation goals are achieved at the expense of the
short-sighted program that was designed to act in an expedient way (e.g. by processing only
the minimum critical information for activation) to seize present and certain opportunities
(short-term goals) before they are depleted, foregone, or the possibility of seizing them
becomes less certain or riskier. As we will argue below, a set of social emotions appears to
have also evolved in light of these tradeoffs, designed for specifically regulating the
interaction behaviors of self and others when faced with social dilemmas.
Focusing on the adaptive problem of managing trust-based interactions, we define
“trust” (after Rousseau et al., 1998) as that which is demonstrated by willfully ceding
resources or control to another with the expectation (but no necessary assurance) that the
other intends to reciprocate and not be opportunistic. Likewise, “trustworthiness” is that
which is demonstrated by not succumbing to available opportunism so as to restitute the
resources or control that another has ceded by extending trust. Later in this chapter we present
data about the activation of emotions, arguing that their patterned experience is affected by
the amount to which trust and trustworthiness can actually be demonstrated, which we claim
depends on the amount of opportunism available.
For the purpose of understanding the regulation of trust-based behaviors, we
hypothesize that both investors and trustees have two mutually exclusive goals {U, V} that
are traded off. U, the long-term goal of developing a trust-based exchange relationship is
achieved when an investor cedes resources, investing them in the Trustee stranger and then
recouping investment when the Trustee fulfills the implicit expectation of a trust-based
exchange relationship by returning a value equal to or in excess of the investment. Assuming
an unrestricted action space and no certain assurances of returns, the larger the amount
invested, the greater the Investor’s demonstrable trust. We consider demonstrable
trustworthiness to be conservatively bounded and achieved when, at minimum, the amount
returned under these conditions is greater or equal to the amount sent. V, the short-term goal
of securing material gains, is achieved by maximizing earnings given the opportunities and
decisions made. For a more detailed computational explanation of how successes and failures
of short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs trigger specific emotions see
Schniter, Sheremeta, and Shields (2013).
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2. Intra- and interpersonal recalibrations in pursuit of short- and long-sighted
program goals. Evolutionary psychologists (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, Cosmides & Tooby,
2000) have argued that emotions are ultimately designed to deal with adaptive problems
requiring program orchestration. Such problems arise, for example, when decision dilemmas
simultaneous activate competing behavior regulation programs within an individual’s mind.
We theorize that the emotional system, serving short and long-sighted programs,
computationally assesses and manages the internal (intrapersonal) and external (interpersonal)
conflicts aroused by social dilemmas, through activating mixes of both positive and negative
emotional outputs. These emotional outputs affect homeostatic regulation, reinforcement, and
targeted deregulation of behavior regulating programs in self and others.
We conjecture that while most (15/20) emotions studied are capable of serving both
short-sighted and long-sighted programs, the remaining 5 (proud, believable, embarrassed,
ashamed, guilty) appear designed for facilitating the long-sighted program’s goal pursuit.
Several theorists including moral philosophers (Hume, 1740; Smith, 1759), moral
psychologists (Kohlberg, 1971; Haidt, 2003; Ketelaar, 2006) evolutionary biologists (Darwin,
1872/1965; Trivers, 1971; Nesse, 1990), and economists (Hirschleifer, 1987; Frank, 1988)
have also identified among humans a set of emotions designed to reinforce or commit one
towards socially appropriate behavior, or recalibrate self and others towards socially desirable
behavior. For example, in his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1759,
Part I, Section I, Chapter II, p. 13) describes “the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy”:
But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us
more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast;
nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary. Those who are fond of
deducing all our sentiments from certain refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss
to account, according to their own principles, both for this pleasure and this pain. As the
person who is principally interested in any event is pleased with our sympathy, and hurt by the
want of it, so we, too, seem to be pleased when we are able to sympathize with him, and to be
hurt when we are unable.

Social emotions appear designed to service the adaptive goals of the long-sighted
program: they encourage pursuit and cultivation of reciprocal exchange relationships and
concern individuals with their efficient integration into society. Social emotions may
encourage cooperation by either directly or indirectly inducing commitments to long-term
exchange relationships, despite the “commitment” problem (Frank, 1988) presented by the
interests of the short-sighted program (i.e., that immediate rewards are highly attractive and
thus incentivize against the pursuit of long-term rewards).
In the next section we elaborate on the functions of some specific social emotions,
suggesting that the experience of certain emotions (e.g., feeling believable and proud in the
context of social exchange dilemmas) serves to positively reinforce the relative calibration of
the long-sighted program with reward by encouraging the recognition and derivation of
pleasure from the achievement of its goal. Likewise, when one behaves in a way that would
harm one’s positive reputation in the adaptive ancestral environment, some form of postdecision regret triggered by the long-sighted program may provide a “feeling” that, at the next
decision juncture, serves to motivate a stronger pursuit of the cooperative goals of the longsighted program (e.g. see Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg et al., 2008). We suggest that feeling
guilty, embarrassed, and ashamed in the context of these social exchange interactions is one

Recalibrational Emotions and the Regulation of Trust-Based Behaviors

15

of various ways that emotions serving the long-sighted program coerce a downregulation of
the short-sighted program. In the next section we elaborate on recalibrational functions of
several of the social emotions that can increase cooperative propensity, while indicating
which emotions can also function to promote opportunism.

D. Etiological classification of twenty basic recalibrational emotions
A few theoreticians (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2004) have
argued that by moving beyond the more simplistic models of valence (or positive and
negative affect) to models of design-specific emotions, we gain even greater explanatory
power of how emotions affect behavior. We are sympathetic to the arguments (e.g. Frank,
1988; Griffiths, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Haselton & Ketelaar,
2006; Tooby et al., 2008) that specific emotions are designed to solve specific adaptive
problems because by identifying designs specifics we can generate nuanced predictions.
In this section we propose etiologies of 20 recalibrational emotions, the emotional
states associated with these emotions, and finally a parsimonious functional taxonomy based
on their positive, negative, intrapersonal, interpersonal, short-sighted and long-sighted
dimensions. We constructed a survey of a large array of (twenty) emotional states, based on
the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS), a self-report measure of positive and
negative affect states developed by Watson et al. (1988) that has been demonstrated across
large non-clinical samples to be a reliable and valid measure of these states (Crawford &
Henry, 2004). We chose to functionally classify and predict the reported experience of these
20 emotions sometimes used in versions of the PANAS and detailed below because we
recognized from prior work that laboratory participants likely experienced these and would be
willing to report those experiences (e.g. after engaging in incentivized trust-based
interactions).
Variants of the PANAS are among the most widely used surveys of emotional states
in the social sciences today. The classification system which we propose allows us to not only
identify the positive and negative affect valence of emotions that recalibrate short- and longsighted behavior regulation programs, but also to identify the behavior regulation programs
they serve, and whether the programs that they target (for recalibration) are in self or other. In
later sections we provide results of confirmatory factor analyses of these two alternatives, and
in doing so attempt to persuade the reader that our multidimensional Recalibrational Model is
more interpretable and better describes the data than the standard Valence Model. But first,
we describe the functional features that we conjecture each of these 20 recalibrational
emotions to have.
1. (1-20) Basic recalibrational emotions: functional features proposed.
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(1/20) Appreciation: Appreciation, like “gratitude”,30 is a positive emotion
(experienced when one feels appreciative) that is triggered when short- and/or long-sighted
program goals were achieved as a consequence of another’s non-opportunistic actions, and
under conditions where similar non-opportunistic actions (e.g. reciprocation) could not be
immediately demonstrable (consistent with Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). As an inter-personal 31
positive emotion, the signal features of gratitude indicate to a receiver that the appreciative
signaler has positive regard for the receiver’s welfare and acknowledges a present debt while
simultaneously indicating a willingness or propensity to engage in cooperative or helpful
interaction (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). Gratitude effectively signals to a receiver that a
cooperative relationship, now with intent to deliver future returns, has been established,
representing a successful achievement of the receiver’s long-sighted program. In turn, this
input causes the receiver’s programs to maintain homeostasis (i.e., the intrapersonal function),
so as to ensure future cooperative interactions with the appreciative signaler. Experimental
evidence supports a similar functional account of gratitude (Algoe et al., 2008; Algoe &
Haidt, 2009; McCullough et al., 2001).
(2/20) Happiness: Happiness is a positive emotion32 (experienced when one feels
happy) that is triggered when the short- and/or long-sighted program goals were achieved. 33
As a positive emotion, it maintains the homeostatic calibration of ego’s successful program(s)
used for making decisions under situations similar to the one which led to the success.
Happiness also acts as a signal, giving it interpersonal functionality that encourages
calibration to ensure the homeostatic maintenance of the other’s program(s) that ensured the
outcome which triggered it. When happiness is consequent of an interpersonal interaction and
a happy individual signals her happiness to a receiver, it indicates to the receiver a successful
achievement of one or both of the signaler’s short- and long-sighted programs. In turn, this
input causes the receiver’s behavior regulation programs to maintain homeostasis, so as to
ensure future successful interactions with the signaler.
(3/20) Contentment: Contentment, like happiness, is a positive emotion (experienced
when one feels content) that is triggered when the short- and/or long-sighted program goals
were achieved.34 As a positive emotion that accompanies an increased sense of security,
relief, or satiation, it maintains the homeostatic calibration of successful program(s) used for
making decisions under situations similar to the one that led to the contentment. Contentment
also acts as a signal, giving it interpersonal functionality. When contentment is consequent of
30

For similar perspectives on gratitude see Smith (1759), Trivers (1971), Hirshleifer (1987), Haidt (2003),
Cosmides and Tooby (2000), Tooby and Cosmides (1990), Gallup (1998), McCullough et al. (2001), and Algoe et
al. (2008).
31
However, for an intrapersonal account of gratitude, see Simmel (1950) and Gouldner (1960).
32
According to Shaver et al. (1987) happiness is within a “joy” category along with contentment, cheerfulness,
triumph, and overlapping subcategories including excitement, zest, contentment, pride, optimism, enthrallment, and
relief.
33
For similar accounts of happiness specific to adaptive goals see Nesse and Williams (1999), and Cosmides and
Tooby (2000); for similar accounts of happiness generalized to generic goals see Izard (1977), Smith and Lazarus
(1990), Lazarus (1991), Nesse (1990), de Catanzaro (1999), and Rayo and Becker (2007).
34
For similar accounts of contentment specific to adaptive goals see Ellsworth and Smith (1988b), Izard (1977),
Lazarus (1991), Nesse and Williams (1999), and Cosmides and Tooby (2000).
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an interpersonal interaction and a content individual signals her contentment to a receiver, it
indicates a successful achievement from perspective of one or both of the signaler’s shortand long-sighted programs. In turn, this input causes the receiver’s behavior regulation
programs to maintain homeostasis, so as to ensure future successful interactions with the
signaler.
(4/20) Cheerfulness: Cheerfulness is a positive emotion35 (experienced when one
feels cheerful) that is triggered when the short- and/or long-sighted program goals were
achieved.36 As an intrapersonally functional positive emotion, it should maintain homeostatic
calibration of successful program(s) used for making decisions under situations similar to the
one which led to the cheer. Cheerfulness also acts as a signal (sometimes called “cheer”),
giving it interpersonal functionality.37 When cheerfulness is consequent of an interpersonal
interaction and a cheerful individual signals her cheerfulness to a receiver, the receiver’s
long-sighted program recognizes cues of successful goal achievement(s) in the signaler. This
input sometimes causes the recipient to creating a mirrored cheerfulness, but more
importantly it causes the receiver’s programs to maintain homeostatic calibration, so as to
ensure future successful interactions with the signaler.
(5/20) Triumph: Triumph is a positive emotion (experienced when one feels
triumphant) 38 that is triggered when the short- and/or long-sighted program goals were
achieved 39 (or when success is recognized),40 despite the “effort” (a time-cumulative emotion
produced by the non-dominant program consequent of its forgone utilities) and encumbrance
experience in pursuing those achieved goals. As an intra-personal positive emotion,41 it
should maintain homeostatic calibration of ego’s successful program(s) used for making
decisions under situations similar to the one which led to the triumph, or else (for example if a
change of events has made available an opportunity) increase the goal pursuit of the
potentially successful program relative to a competing program.
(6/20) Inspiration: Inspiration (synonymous with “hope”)42 is a positive emotion
(experienced when one feels inspired) that is triggered when events have indicated that the
short- and/or long-sighted program goals were achieved. As an intra-personal positive
emotion, it should maintain the relative calibration of ego’s successful program(s) used for
making decisions under situations similar to the one which led to the inspiration, or else (for

35

Alternatively, Frijda (2000) argued that cheerfulness is not an emotion but a mood that might not be tied to an
antecedent and might endure over a long time.
36
For a similar account of cheerfulness specific to adaptive goals see Grinde (2002).
37
For similar perspective of cheerfulness as an interpersonal signal see Metts and Bowers (1994).
38
Triumph is not to be confused with dominance, the emotion that (when one feels “triumphant over” another) is
sometimes experienced positively on the intrapersonal level, but negatively on the interpersonal level (when one
signals a confident aggressive positioning over another).
39
For similar perspective on triumph see Sauter and Scott (2007).
40
See de Catanzaro (1999, p.228) who wrote that success “is energizing and can encourage effort”.
41
Alternatively, Sauter and Scott (2007) argued that non-verbal vocalizations can signal a triumphant state.
42
For example, see Lazarus et al. (1980), and Smith and Lazarus (1990) for similar interpretations of hope.
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example if a change of events has made available an opportunity) increase the goal pursuit 43
of the potentially successful program relative to a competing program.
(7/20) Security: Security, similar to “confidence”,44 self-assurance and certainty, is a
positive emotion45 (experienced when one feels secure) that is triggered when the shortand/or long-sighted program goals were achieved, bringing the perspective that risks of not
achieving the relevant goal are manageable or low.46 If a change of events has provoked it,
security may be felt when one no longer feels the despair of prior uncertainty (for example as
exacerbated by dilemmas).47 As an intra-personal positive emotion that accompanies an
increased sense of contentment, relief, or satiation, it should maintain ego’s homeostatic
calibration of the successful program it serves under choice dilemmas similar to the one
which led to the success.
(8/20) Pride: Pride is a positive emotion48 (experienced when one feels proud) that is
triggered when long-sighted program goals were achieved49 and when a choice dilemma has
put one’s social position at stake.50 As an intra-personal51 positive emotion, it should maintain
homeostatic calibration of ego’s successful long-sighted program under choice dilemmas
similar to the one that led to the success.
(9/20) Believability: Believability, similar to “reliability” or “trustworthiness”, 52
“credulousness” and “credibility”,53 is an intrapersonal positive emotion (experienced when

43

For a similar account of inspiration provoking goal pursuit see Thrash and Elliot (2004).
See Folkman and Lazarus (1988) who defined confidence as an upregulator of motivation to continue pursuit of a
goal.
45
See Shaver et al. (1987) who argue that security is within a “loving” category along with feeling loved, warm,
and trusting.
46
For a similar account of the “feeling” of security, distinct from the reality state, see Schneier (2008).
47
Hume described (1740/1978, book II, part III, section III, p. 421-422) security in the absence of despair from
uncertainty exacerbated by dilemmas: “For ‘tis observable that an opposition of passions commonly causes a new
emotion in the spirits, and produces more disorder, than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force. …The
same effect follows whether the opposition arises from internal motives or external obstacles… Uncertainty has the
same influence on opposition. The agitation of the thought; the quick turns it makes from one view to another; the
variety of passions, which succeed each other, according to different views: All these produce an agitation in the
mind, and transfuse themselves into the predominant passion. There is not in my opinion any other natural cause,
why security diminishes the passions, than because it removes that uncertainty, which increases them….For the
same reason, despair, tho’ contrary to security, has a like influence.”
48
For similar accounts see Fessler (2001) who argues pride is a “reward”, and Nesse (1990) who argues pride
brings “moral satisfaction”.
49
Darwin (1872/1965) used “pride” synonymously with “arrogance”. At the time of Darwin and at least a century
earlier (e.g. see the original A Dictionary of the English Language by Samuel Johnson, 1755) pride was typically
understood as a socially undesirable emotion (“which manifests itself in lofty airs, distance, reserve and
often contempt of others”) felt after one’s short-term self-interested goals were achieved. Several dictionaries still
carry this negative connotation for pride, e.g. Wiktionary gave “pride” (2013 – having imported its definitions from
the 1913 edition of Webster’s Dictionary) the former and following (quoted) definitions: “unreasonable conceit of
one's own superiority… insolence or arrogance of demeanor; haughty bearing and conduct; insolent exultation;
disdain”.
50
See Gilbert & Andrews (1998) who argued that pride is triggered when social attention is directed towards one
for actions which were appropriate, customary, and not excessive.
51
Alternatively, an interpersonal account of pride has been argued by Fessler (1999).
52
For accounts of “reliability” or “trustworthiness” similar to “believability” see Maathuis et al. (2004).
53
For accounts of “credulousness” and “credibility” similar to “believability” see Keller and Aaker (1998).
44
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one feels believable) that is triggered when one’s long-sighted program goals were achieved
because another has trusted ego and ego has acted in a trustworthy manner.54 After a trustbased interaction, only the Trustee, who may have been trusted or “believed in”, has a
(interaction antecedent) reason to feel believable or trustworthy. As an intra-personal positive
emotion, it should maintain the homeostatic calibration of ego’s successful long-sighted
program under choice dilemmas similar to the one that led to the success.
(10/20) Surprise: Surprise is an intrapersonal emotion55 (experienced when one feels
surprised), either positively56 or negatively valenced that is triggered when the short- and/or
long-sighted program goals failed to be achieved despite expectations to the contrary.
Negative surprise, sometimes called “shock” (Ortony et al., 1988), is often accompanied by
any of several potential concomitant negative emotions (e.g. disappointment, sadness, anger).
Negative surprise recalibrates one to be more likely to expect unfulfilled goals so that their
goal systems do not inappropriately expect goals achieved in conditions where one’s own
actions were to blame or in conditions contingent on others’ actions.57 It is remarkably
difficult to interpret the valence (positive or negative) of others surprise reactions without
contextual cues or concomitant valenced emotional signals. On its own, surprise does not
appear to be a signal designed for affecting inter-personal recalibration.
(11/20) Disgust: Disgust has deep phylogenetic roots as an emotion,58 and was
originally evolved to act as a revulsion response towards potential contamination, helping
protect an organism from ingesting potentially harmful substances, thereby promoting disease
avoidance.59 Disgust appears to have more recently been adapted to function as an
interpersonal and intrapersonal negative emotion for dealing with “contamination” of socially
undesirable elements (experienced when one feels disgusted by, or revulsion towards, others
or domains of behavior). When another’s actions have caused one to fail to achieve one’s own
short- and/or long-sighted program goals, and when recalibration of the other’s responsible
behaviors is not a worthwhile endeavor (e.g. recalibration attempts via anger or verbal
communication would lead to more losses than gains), then the negative “disgust” emotion is
triggered, making the other a social object of disgust. As a negative emotion, it downregulates
the likelihood of interaction with the disgusting person60 under choice dilemmas similar to the
54

For similar accounts of believability see Maathuis et al. (2004), Hovland et al. (1953), Sternthal and Craig (1982).
For a similar account of surprise as an emotion see Wierzbicka (1992). Alternatively, Ortony et al. (1988) and
Ortony and Turner (1990) argued that because surprise is not “valenced” as only positive or only negative, it is not
an emotion.
56
See Shaver et al. (1987) who argued that “amazement” and “astonishment” are emotions often associated with
positive surprise.
57
See Izard (1991) and Tomkins (1962) who argued that surprise encourages adjustment of expectation.
58
Comparative, phylogenetic work has shown selective impairment in humans in the recognition and experience of
disgust, together with strong evidence of homology in mammals’ (rats, mice, monkeys) and also lizards’ and
electric fish’s emotion systems (Lawrence & Calder, 2004).
59
For functional accounts of disgust as a human universal for contamination avoidance see Cisler et al. (2009) and
David and Olatunji (2011).
60
For similar arguments about the social avoidance and distancing functions of disgust, see Haselton and Ketelaar
(2006), Tybur et al. (2009), and Rozin et al. (1993). For a compatible argument about avoidance of risks, see Fessler
et al., (2004). The generic feature of disgust, downregulating the likelihood of interaction with an object of disgust,
also generalizes to mate and incest avoidance functions of disgust (e.g. see Westermarck, 1926; Tybur et al., 2009;
55
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one which led to the failure of the program it serves. Disgust also acts as a signal, giving it
interpersonal functionality. When a disgusted individual signals her disgust to a receiver, the
receiver experiences a negative emotion that likewise downregulates the programs which
were instrumental in the interaction’s “failure” to achieve the signaler’s program(s’) goals.
(12/20) Jealousy: Jealousy is an interpersonal and intrapersonal negative emotion
(experienced when one feels jealous). When, contrary to expectations, another’s actions have
caused one to fail to achieve one’s own short- and/or long-sighted program goals, yet
consequent on those actions the other has achieved their own goals,61 then the negative
“jealousy” emotion is triggered.62 As a negative emotion, it downregulates the competing
program that has compromised the success of the program it is serves. Coupled with an
outlook that should prohibit the repetition of past mistakes, jealousy encourages the
recruitment of, and increase in behaviors like monitoring, vigilance, and aggression. These
behaviors can alter the parameters of choice dilemmas to increase the chance of a jealous
individual achieving her short- and/or long-sighted program goals. Jealousy also acts as a
signal, giving it interpersonal functionality. When a jealous individual signals her jealousy to
a receiver, the receiver experiences a negative emotion which likewise downregulates any of
his programs which were instrumental in the “failure” to achieve the signaler’s program(s’)
goals.
(13/20) Aggravation: Aggravation, like frustration, is an interpersonal and
intrapersonal negative emotion (experienced when one feels aggravated). When obstacles,
one’s own actions, and/or another’s actions prevent one from achieving one’s own shortand/or long-sighted program goal(s), then aggravation can inhibit continued attempts under
similar conditions.63 Aggravation, more than frustration, is triggered by others actions. As an
intrapersonal negative emotion, aggravation downregulates the previously unsuccessful
program (competing within ego) in the choice dilemma. Aggravation also acts as a signal,
giving it interpersonal functionality. When an aggravated individual signals her aggravation
to a receiver, the receiver experiences a negative emotion which likewise downregulates
targeted programs which might have been instrumental in the signaler’s “failure” to achieve
his program(s’) goals. By downregulating problematic programs in the other, an aggravated
individual can alter the parameters of her choice dilemmas, increasing the chance of
achieving short- and/or long-sighted program goals.
(14/20) Frustration: Frustration, like aggravation, is an interpersonal and
intrapersonal negative emotion (experienced when one feels frustrated). When obstacles,
one’s own actions, and/or another’s actions in pursuit of ego’s short- and/or long-sighted
Lieberman, et al., 2003; Fessler & Navarette, 2003, 2004) as well as toxin avoidance, contamination avoidance, and
evacuation functions of disgusts (e.g., see Rozin et al., 1994; Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006; Tybur et al., 2009; Curtis
et al., 2004; Fessler, et al., 2004; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Curtis & Biran, 2001; and Levenson, 1999).
61
For similar accounts of jealousy given one’s relative misfortune see Clanton and Smith (1987), Parrot and Smith
(1993), and de Catanzaro (1999).
62
While the antecedent of jealousy that we identify roughly maps onto the antecedent conditions that activate
sexual jealousy (e.g. see Thornhill & Palmer, 2000), we consider sexual jealousy a distinctly different emotion.
63
For a similar account of aggravation see Ortony et al. (1988).
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program goals produced a failure (i.e. those goals could not be achieved), then frustration can
inhibit continued attempts under similar conditions. Frustration, more than aggravation, is
triggered by obstacles or one’s own actions. As an intrapersonal negative emotion, frustration
downregulates the previously unsuccessful program competing in the choice dilemma.
Frustration can also encourage aggression against others that inhibit goal achievement and/or
it can act as a signal, giving it interpersonal functionality. When a frustrated individual signals
her frustration, the receiver experiences a negative emotion which likewise downregulates
any of his targeted programs which might have been instrumental in the signaler’s “failure” to
achieve his program(s’) goals. By downregulating problematic programs in the other, an
aggravated individual can alter the parameters of her choice dilemmas, increasing the chance
of achieving short- and/or long-sighted program goals.
(15/20) Anger: Anger has deep phylogenetic roots as an emotion.64 Anger is an
interpersonal and intrapersonal negative emotion (experienced when one feels angry). When
another has caused one an offense or another’s actions have caused one to fail to achieve
one’s own short- and/or long-sighted program goals, and when recalibration of the other’s
responsible behaviors via inflicted harm or restricted benefits might bring improvements, then
the interpersonal negative “anger” emotion is triggered.65 As a negative emotion, it leads to
the imposition of costs or restriction of benefits on the targeted individual, ultimately
downregulating (within the targeted individual) the targeted program’s weight relative to
other competing programs under choice dilemmas like the one that led to the failure.66 The
interpersonal function of anger has been recognized since at least the time of Aristotle.67 By
inflicting costs or restricting benefits to the other, an angered individual can alter the
parameters of her choice dilemmas, increasing the chance of achieving her short- and/or longsighted program goals. Anger also acts as a signal, giving it additional interpersonal
functionality.68 When an angry individual signals her anger, the receiver experiences a
64

Comparative, phylogenetic work has shown selective impairment in humans in the recognition and experience of
anger -together with strong evidence of homology across various mammals’ (rats, mice, monkeys) and also lizards’
and electric fish’s emotion systems (Lawrence & Calder, 2004)
65
For similar interpersonal functional accounts of anger, see Nesse (1990), Keltner et al. (1993), Allred et al.
(1997), Fehr and Gachter (2002), Cohen et al. (1996), Daly and Wilson (1988), Luckenbill (1977), Toch (1969),
Webster and Kirkpatrick (2006), Sell (2006), Sell et al. (2009), Tooby et al. (2008), and Ortony et al. (1988).
66
Some scholars have proposed that anger may have evolved to address defection in an interaction partner (Fessler
& Haley, 2003; Keltner, et al., 1993). For example, retaliation against defectors, as motivated by anger, may be
costly in the short-term but pay off in the long-term if it leads defectors to repent and become cooperative (Fessler
& Haley, 2003). Physiologically and cognitively, anger has been shown to facilitate retaliatory action (Cannon,
1929; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), making defectors more likely to cooperate because their costs of future defection
are increased. Experimental evidence of altruistic or costly punishment has shown that this deterrence mechanism is
plausible (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).
67
Aristotle (in Rhetoric, Book II chapter 2) argued that “anger” is an emotion that is both practical and intelligent,
essentially involving both goals and cognition. Aristotle reasoned that anger provokes a desire for vengeance
because of an unjustified offense or slight.
68
Fessler (2010) and Frank (1988) proposed that anger had “deterrence” effects on third parties. Anger has also
been suggested to be a powerful way of averting defection, because it signals retaliation or opposition, rectifies
injustice, and socially corrects wrongdoings (Averill, 1983; De Cremer, Van Kleef, & Wubben, 2007; Frijda &
Mesquita, 1994). Nesse (1990) wrote: “Anger includes not only threats to abandon the relationship, but also spiteful
threats to harm the other person, often at great cost to the self. Anger is not a reasoned negotiating ploy; it is an
agitated, irrational, unpredictable state of aggressive arousal. Anger signals that a defection or potential defection
has been detected and will not be tolerated. Its most basic function is to protect against exploitation. But by
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negative emotion that likewise downregulates any of his programs which were instrumental in
the interaction’s “failure” at achieving the signaler’s program(s’) goals. When one’s own
actions in pursuit of short- and/or long-sighted program goals produced the failure, then one’s
anger can be self-directed.69 Acting as an intra-personal negative emotion, self-anger
downregulates the competing program that has compromised the success of the program it
serves.
(16/20) Depression: Depression is an interpersonal and intrapersonal negative
emotion (experienced when one feels depressed, melancholic, sad, despondent, hopeless,
uninterested, anhedonic, and unable to focus on normal activities). Depression is triggered
when one’s own and/or another’s actions or other obstacles produced a failure to achieve
one’s own short- and/or long-sighted program goals (i.e. those goals could not be achieved).
For example when one’s functional status becomes reduces (e.g. as a result of disability, bad
luck) or when one experiences social conflict, then the negative “depression” emotion is
triggered. As a negative emotion, it downregulates the previously failed program’s weight
relative to other competing programs under choice dilemmas like the one that led to the
triggering failure. 70 An additional feature of depressive symptoms is the focusing and
rumination of thoughts pertaining to the failed goal pursuit.71 In doing so, depression
“punishes”, inflicting costs and/or restricting benefits on both self and other. As a depressive
episode progresses it may intensify and either lead the victim into self-destruction or motivate
her to avoid its destructive and unproductive sentence (e.g. through pursuit of new goals or
transition to a new environment). Chances to achieve short- and/or long-sighted program
goals may also be improved through indirect signaling effects of depression, giving it
interpersonal functionality. When a depressed individual signals her depression to a receiver,
the receiver experiences a negative emotion which likewise downregulates any of his
programs which may have contributed to triggering the signaler’s depression. 72 Conditional
on sympathy, the receiver’s long-sighted program may be encouraged to upregulate its
calibration relative to competing programs, so as to assist in a rehabilitation of the depressed
individual and ensure future successful interactions with the signaler.
(17/20) Sadness: Sadness, also melancholy, depression, or disappointment,73 is an
interpersonal and intrapersonal negative emotion (experienced when one feels sad). When
increasing the cost to a potential defector, the threat of spiteful retaliation also, paradoxically, helps to preserve
relationships.”
69
For similar accounts of a self-angry state, synonymous with “regretful”, see Ellsworth and Tong (2006),
Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997), Zeelenberg (1999), and Zeelenberg et al., (2008).
70
For similar accounts made of behavior deregulating effects of depression and like phenomena, see Darwin
(1872/1965), Lewis (1934), Nesse and Williams (1999), Nesse (2000), and Hagen (2003).
71
For similar accounts of cognitive effects of depression (e.g. rumination) see Nesse (1991), Taylor (1989), Gut
(1989), and Nesse and Williams (1999).
72
Consistent with a downregulation of an offender’s program that promoted another’s depression, competing
programs in the offender gain greater relative efficacy, which may in turn lead to behaviors that assist in achieving
goals of the depressed persons goals (e.g. depression may function to recruit help, see Smith & Lazarus, 1990 and
Hagen, 2003).
73
Disappointment has been suggested to be an emotion which can help address the problem of others’ defection
(Lelieveld et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2006; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008; Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk,
2009). As an emotional reaction experienced in response to unfulfilled positive expectations (Frijda, 1986; Van Dijk
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one’s own and/or another’s actions in pursuit of one’s short- and/or long-sighted program
goals produced a failure (i.e. those goals could not be achieved), then the negative “sadness”
emotion is triggered. As a negative intra-personal emotion, it downregulates ego’s
unsuccessful program’s weight relative to other competing programs under choice dilemmas
like the one that led to the failure.74 Displayed sadness can have mirrored effects on observers
and in doing so can lead to paralysis of social interactions with the sad person. In doing so,
sadness inflicts costs and/or restricts benefits to both self and other. Chances to achieve shortand/or long-sighted program goals may be indirectly affected by signaling effects of sadness,
giving it interpersonal functionality. When a sad individual signals her sadness to a receiver,
the receiver experiences a negative emotion that likewise downregulates any of his programs
which were instrumental in the interaction’s “failure” at achieving the signaler’s program(s’)
goal(s).75 Conditional on sympathy, the receiver’s long-sighted program may be encouraged
to upregulate its relative calibration to competing programs, so as to assist in a rehabilitation
of the sad individual and ensure future successful interactions with the signaler.
(18/20) Embarrassment: Embarrassment is an interpersonal and intrapersonal
negative emotion (experienced when one feels embarrassed). When one’s actions in pursuit of
short-sighted program goals produced a failure that affects one’s character as a cooperator or
as an adherent of social conventions,76 maintenance of which is pursuant to one’s longsighted program goals of developing cooperative relationships, then the negative
“embarrassment” emotion is triggered. Acting as an intrapersonal negative emotion,
embarrassment recalibrates the value of the long-sighted program goals (e.g. conforming to
social conventions) revaluing the tradeoffs between opportunism and trust-based cooperation.
In carrying out this recalibrational work, embarrassment motivates behavior conforming to
social conventions and/or appeasing the offended.77 Embarrassment also acts as a signal,
giving it interpersonal functionality.78 When an embarrassed individual signals she is
& Van Harreveld, 2008; Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & Van der Pligt, 1999), expressing disappointment to the person
that caused this emotion communicates that one had higher expectations of this person. It is this message rather than
its action tendency (because disappointment is associated with a tendency to do nothing) that makes disappointment
effective in inducing cooperation (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008), eliciting concessions (Timmers, Fischer, &
Manstead, 1998; Van Kleef et al., 2006; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008), and motivating corrective and remedial
behaviors like making amends and rectifying transgressions (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Frijda &
Mesquita, 1994; Lewis, 2008).
74
For similar accounts of sadness like phenomena see Nesse (1990, 1999), Fredrickson (1998), and Smith and
Lazarus (1990).
75
Consistent with a downregulation of programs that led to another’s sadness, competing programs gain relative
efficacy, which may in turn lead to behaviors that assist in achieving goals of the sad person (e.g. sadness may
function to recruit help, see Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Hagen, 2003).
76
For similar accounts, see Edelmann (1987), Keltner (1995), Keltner and Buswell (1996, 1997), Keltner et al.
(1997), Miller (1992), Miller and Tangney (1994), Tangney (1992), and Buss (1980).
77
For similar accounts of appeasement and reconciliations functions of embarrassment, see Goffman (1967), Miller
and Leary (1992), Eisenberg et al. (1989), Keltner (1995). Keltner and Buswell (1997), Keltner et al., (1997),
Gilbert and Trower (1990), Scheff (1988), Semin and Manstead (1982), Tangney et al. (1996), de Waal (1989),
Shields et al., (1990), and de Jong, (1999).
78
Borg et al. (1988), Izard (1977), Kaufman (1989), Lewis (1971), and Lewis (1990) have all argued that
embarrassment is theoretically equivalent or highly similar to shame (with embarrassment being a “mild form” of
shame). While we note the similarities, we agree with Tangney et al. (1996) who distinguished the experience of
embarrassment with an accompanied sense of social exposure and heightened concern for others’ judgments –
features that, unlike guilt, also make it more difficult to experience privately.
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embarrassed to an offended individual or a social group at large, the receiver(s) of the signal
may recognize that pre-emptive recalibration has been taken, voluntarily on the part of the
embarrassed signaler. If an embarrassed signaler has already recalibrated herself
appropriately, then the recalibrational emotions (e.g. anger or disgust) that the offence would
otherwise trigger, and their consequent behavioral outputs (e.g., aggression or revulsion), may
be unnecessary.
(19/20) Shame: Shame is an interpersonal and intrapersonal negative emotion
(experienced when one feels ashamed). When one’s opportunistic actions in pursuit of shortsighted program goals produced a failure that affects one’s trusting or trustworthy character,
maintenance of which is pursuant to the long-sighted program goals,79 then the negative
“shame” emotion is triggered. Acting as an intrapersonal negative emotion, shame
recalibrates the value of the long-sighted program’s goal (e.g. conforming to social
conventions), revaluing the tradeoffs between opportunism and trust-based cooperation, 80
downregulating the short-sighted program which produced the previous opportunistic
behaviors. To rebuild their harmed reputations, ashamed offenders tend to increase their
propensity to act in a trusting or trustworthy manner and/or appease the offended.81 Shame
also acts as a signal, giving it interpersonal functionality.82 When a shameful individual
signals83 she is ashamed, the offended party receiving the signal may recognize that preemptive recalibration, in some form of hedonic self-abasement, has been voluntarily taken on
the part of the ashamed signaler 84 and that the interpersonal recalibrational emotions (e.g.
anger or disgust) that the offence would otherwise trigger in the victim of the offence, and
their consequent behavioral outputs (e.g. aggression or revulsion) may be unnecessary.85

79

Fessler (2001, 2007) argued that shame is an aversive feeling produced when social actions (e.g. a failure to act
responsibly or violation of a norm) produce a perceived lowering of one’s relative social status. For other similar
accounts, see Buss (1980), Scheff (1988), Edelmann (1987), Keltner (1995), Keltner and Buswell (1996, 1997),
Keltner et al. (1997), Miller (1992), Miller and Tangney (1994), and Tangney (1992).
80
Cosmides and Tooby (2000), and Tooby and Cosmides (1990) offer a “recomputational” account of shame.
81
For similar accounts of appeasement and reconciliations functions of embarrassment, see Miller and Leary
(1992), Eisenberg et al. (1989), Keltner and Buswell (1996, 1997), Keltner et al. (1997), Gilbert and Trower (1990),
Scheff (1988), de Waal (1989), Shields et al. (1990), de Hooge et al. (2008), and de Jong (1999). Additionally,
Nesse (1990) suggested that guilt enforces obedience to rules of social conduct.
82
For a similar intrapersonal and interpersonal account of shame see Sznycer et al. (2012).
83
Darwin (1872/1965, p.325) argued that blushing, which he attributed to “self-attention... [about]...what others
think of us...”, is a recognized cue that might be at work in the signaling of shame. Fessler (2007) described the role
of shame and pride in rank-striving and approval-seeking behavior. Fessler also described behavioral features of
shame and pride (e.g. avoiding eye contact and seeking it, respectively) making shame appear much like a form of
“self-disgust” or “self-punishment” (Wallington, 1973).
84
Regret and depression, which may accompany shame after the commission of an offense, contribute to the
offender’s demeanor and, in their expressions, signal that the offender has undergone recalibration (reforming
towards a more socially desirable disposition) since having committed the offense (Buss, 1990; Plutchik, 1980).
85
Giner-Sorolla et al. (2008) have shown that an offender’s self-abasement, as opposed to a mere admission of
culpability and regret decreases the insult that those in the “outgroup” attribute to the offense: when offenders felt
ashamed and issue apologies, recipients of the apologies felt less offended than when offenders felt guilty (but not
ashamed) and issue apologies.
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(20/20) Guilt: Guilt is an intrapersonal negative emotion (experienced when one
feels guilty). When, in pursuit of short-sighted program goals, one’s opportunistic actions 86
produced a failure that affects one’s trusting or trustworthy character (maintenance of which
is pursuant to one’s long-sighted program goals),87 then the negative “guilt” emotion is
triggered. Acting as an intra-personal negative emotion, guilt downregulates the short-sighted
program that previously produced opportunistic behaviors, thereby producing behaviors
which increase long-sighted program goals (e.g., developing exchange relationships, issuing
confessions and apologies, and appeasing the offended). 88 Unlike shame and embarrassment,
guilt does not have strong signaling functions.89
2. Taxonomic organization of twenty basic recalibrational emotions. Emotions are
ultimately designed to deal with the adaptive problem of program orchestration (Tooby &
Cosmides, 1990) that arises by the simultaneous activation of competing behavior regulation
programs within an individual’s mind. In considering the nature of adaptive decision
problems encountered in trust-based interactions, we recognize that the outcomes of these
decisions are contingent on not only one’s own actions (according to the calibration of our
internal programs), but also the actions of others (according to the calibration of their
programs). To solve this adaptive problem, triggered emotions have been designed by natural
selection to recalibrate targeted programs in one self and others. As such, it is helpful to
consider a typology of these adaptive problems in terms of their solutions: positive and
negative recalibrations arrived at via intrapersonal and/or interpersonal behavior regulation
(e.g. see Bowlby, 1969; Levenson, 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2004; Butt et al., 2005). A
parsimonious organization of twenty emotional states based on the proposed recalibrational
functions (that we have characterized as positive and negative recalibrations, intrapersonally
and interpersonally targeting short-sighted and long-sighted programs) yields five unique sets
of emotional states, each sharing unique functional features (see table 1) that we expect to be
triggered in concert for common functional purposes.
Of the set of twenty emotional states, nine [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful,
triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable] are experienced as positive, one [surprise]
could be either positive OR negative (forming the unique Set 3), and ten [disgusted, jealous,
aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad, embarrassed, ashamed, guilty] are negative.
Seven [triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable, surprised, guilty] are exclusively
intrapersonal. Fifteen of the twenty emotional states may serve the interests of either short- or
long-sighted adaptive goals. The five emotional states (proud, believable, embarrassed,
86

For accounts of guilt being produced consequent on recognizing that one’s actions appear “wrong” or immoral to
others, see Baumeister et al. (1994, 1995), and Tangney (1991).
87
For similar accounts of guilt see Baumeister et al. (1995), Ketelaar & Au (2003), de Hooge et al. (2007), and
Frank (1988).
88
Several have argued that guilt provokes an increase in remedial and cooperative behaviors (e.g. Ketelaar & Au,
2003; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg et al., 2008; Sznycer et al., 2011; Frank, 1988; Wicker et al., 1983; de Hooge et
al., 2007; Baumeister et al., 1994, 1995; Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009; Tangney et al., 1996; and McCullough et al.,
2001).
89
However, others have argued that guilt has intrapersonal functions (attributed to targeted effects on others by the
guilty person). Wicker et al. (1983) argued that guilt in an offender stops the offended from inflicting costs (on the
offender), while Tangney (1991) and Leith and Baumeister (1998) have argued that guilt increases the offender’s
empathy.
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ashamed, guilty) exclusively serving the long-sighted adaptive goal of achieving cooperation
by encouraging trusting and trustworthy exchange behavior split into two unique sets, one
that is positive (Set 2) and one that is negative (Set 5). The positive emotional states that are
intrapersonal and serve both short-sighted and long-sighted adaptive goals [happy, content,
cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure] form the unique Set 1. The negative emotional states
that are both intrapersonal and interpersonal, and serve both short-sighted and long-sighted
adaptive goals [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad] form the
unique Set 4.
Table 1: Recalibrational taxonomy of twenty basic emotional states.
Recalibration

Adaptive Goal
Set

1

2
3

4

5

Emotional State
Appreciative

Longsighted
X

Shortsighted
X

Happy

X

X

Content

X

Positive

Negative

Intrapersonal

Interpersonal

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Cheerful

X

X

X

X

Triumphant

X

X

X

X

Inspired

X

X

X

X

Secure

X

X

X

X

Proud

X

X

X

Believable

X

X

X

Surprised

X

X

Disgusted

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Jealous

X

X

X

X

X

Aggravated

X

X

X

X

X

Frustrated

X

X

X

X

X

Angry

X

X

X

X

X

Depressed

X

X

X

X

X

Sad

X

X

X

X

X

Embarrassed

X

X

X

X

Ashamed

X

X

X

X

Guilty

X

X

X

Note: X’s indicate conjectured recalibrational features of emotions.
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III. RECALIBRATIONAL EMOTIONS AND DEMONSTRABLE BEHAVIOR
IN THE TRUST GAME
A. Exogenously imposed minimum return rules in the Trust game
Interactions that require trust involve a basic social dilemma where agents have to
trade off the immediate safety that comes with opportunism with the potential delayed
benefits (both monetary and informational) that arise from trusting and trustworthy behavior.
Various researchers have demonstrated that the transfer of resources or power (producing
vulnerability) under dilemma situations characterized by conflict of interests (e.g.
opportunism vs. cooperation) is essential to the development of trusting relationships. These
fundamental principles of trust and trustworthiness have been demonstrated in organizational
research (Curseu & Schruijer, 2010; Yakovleva et al., 2010), in social dilemma research
(Balliet et al., 2013; Parks & Hulbert, 1995; Yamagishi, 2011) and in close relationships
research (Murray et al., 2003; Shallcross & Simpson, 2012).
In the trust game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), trust leads to greater
efficiency and creates possible profits for investors. Another incentive that offsets the
financial risk of investment is the information gained about the propensity to trust and the
trustworthiness of exchange partners in general.90 In the classic trust game, Investors
demonstrate their trust according to the amount of their endowment that they are willing to
put at risk (via trust-based investment) and Trustees demonstrate trustworthiness according to
the proportion of income (from investments) that they voluntarily return to Investors.
Recognizing that the Trust game presents participants with choice dilemmas between
opportunistic short-term rewards and the long-term rewards associated with cultivated
reciprocal exchange relationships, we have previously evaluated participants’ emotional
reports after trust-based interactions, providing evidence that economic decisions and
interactions in a Trust game are reliable predictors of subsequent emotional states (Schniter et
al., 2013). In this chapter we expand the scope of our previous inquiry considering whether
constraints on demonstrable behavior tamper, magnify, or have non-linear effects on
recalibrational emotions. The imposition of minimum return rules in a trust game (such as
implemented by Rietz et al., 2013) to reduce downside risk for investors brings welcome
“assurance” (Yamagishi, 2011) that, at least when sufficient, may trigger positive emotions.
However, in doing so, the imposition of minimum standards of behavior also limits the
information generating potential of the trust-game exchange by constraining the amount that
can be returned voluntarily. As such, under institutions leaving very little discretionary space
for trust-based behavior demonstration, investors and trustees may end up not expecting to
achieve and not fulfilling the goals of the long-sighted program. In turn, these participants for
90

While we studied single, anonymous interactions, we believe trust and reciprocity are rooted in a complex set of
social interactions, experience, and evolved computational psychology that integrate information and apply our
gathered knowledge. Every opportunity to show trust and trustworthiness builds the stock of reputational
information that people can potentially capitalize on or computationally apply to contextualized interactions. In the
trust game, Investors are making choices that not only affect their immediate payoffs, but also allow them to learn
about the reputations of the Trustees that they may find valuable in their own right, in future trust and investment
games, or in other potential interactions or applications.
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whom long-sighted goals are relatively moot, may experience relatively little in terms of
emotions triggered by long-sighted goal outcomes.
To test the effect of demonstrable trust and trustworthiness on reported emotional
experiences following trust-based interactions we modified the basic Trust Game in three
additional treatments. In these treatments we imposed minimum return rules that limited
demonstrable trustworthiness by requiring the Trustee to return to the Investor: either 10%,
20% or 30% of the tripled investment amount received, thereby guaranteeing to the Investor a
10%, 20% or 30% reduction in his downside risk. By limiting the downside risk to the
Investor, the demonstrability of trust via investment becomes proportionally limited.
Likewise, by mandating the minimum amount of a received income that a Trustee must
return, the demonstrability of trustworthiness via returns on investment becomes
proportionally limited as well.
Our trust games proceeded as followed. Each participant was assigned a role, labeled
“Person 1” for the Investor and “Person 2” for the Trustee. The participants interacted only
once in the trust game described below. Each participant was paid $7 for participation and
any additional payoffs from the trust game after signing a receipt. On average participants
earned $10.98 in addition to their participation payment. Three hundred and six participants
interacted in one of the four treatments. In each treatment, the Investor could send any portion
of his $10 endowment to the Trustee with that investment amount tripled on the way. The
Trustee, having received a tripled investment amount, then decided how much to send back
contingent upon the minimum return rule. In the baseline 0% rule treatment, the Trustee could
send back none of the amount received. 91 In 10%, 20% and 30% rule the Trustee had to send
back at least 10%, 20% and 30% of the tripled investment amount received, respectively. 92

B. Previously reported effects of minimum return rules on trust-based
behaviors
With Thomas Rietz and Roman Sheremeta, we previously conducted research
investigating effects of the imposition of minimum return rules on trust and trustworthiness
(see Rietz et al., 2013) and reported results for a data set comprised of 178 participants, a
subset of the larger dataset of 306 participants for which we report new results in this chapter.
Before reviewing our predictions and new results we would like to draw attention to two
important results from our prior study.
Prior Result 1. Exogenously imposed minimum return rule treatments had economic
effects on Investors’ and Trustees’ earnings because of the changes seen in investment and
return rates. Investor and Trustee net profit rates fell to their lowest when a 10% minimum
return rule was imposed. Then, as the restrictiveness of the rule increased across treatments,
91

We used neutral language and did not use words such as “rules.” Moreover, to avoid any confounding effects, we
used the following language in baseline treatment for the trustee: “Person 2 can send back none, more than none, or
all of the amount in Person 2’s account.” In the other three treatments we used: “Person 2 can send back 10% [20%,
30%], more than 10% [20%, 30%], or all of the amount in Person 2’s account.”
92
A button was placed on the Trustees’ screen that, if selected, would trigger a pop-up window displaying the
minimal amount that could be returned.
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profits rose, reaching their maxima in the 30% rule condition where assurance was greatest.
Across treatments, median amounts sent and returned also followed a U-shaped pattern,
similar to the one reported in Figure 2.
$10

$8

$6

$4
0%

10%
20%
Minimum Return Rule
Mean Sent

30%

Mean Return

Figure 2. Mean amount sent and returned per treatment (from Rietz et al., 2013)
Prior Result 2. Exogenously imposed minimum return rule treatments had
behavioral effects on Investors’ demonstrated trust and Trustees’ demonstrated
trustworthiness. By increasing minimum return rules, we not only created an institutional
effect of reducing the limits on downside risk that investors could demonstrate, but also
compromised the propensity to voluntarily demonstrate trust– lowering the median
investment levels from what they may have been without the rule. Figure 2 shows that, as the
rule’s restrictiveness increased, Investors’ demonstrated trust fell, as measured by the
percentage of investment that was at risk. Overall, we also saw that Trustees’ demonstrated
trustworthiness, as indicated by voluntary discretionary returns, was impacted by imposition
of the rules. Upon imposition of the 10% rule, trustworthiness disappeared for the typical
Trustee. Under the 20% and 30% rules, discretionary reciprocity improved slightly, however
the dominant mode remained equal to the minimum required. Thus, like trust, trustworthiness
never returned to the levels observed under the 0% rule.
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Figure 3. Median demonstrable trust and trustworthiness per treatment (from Rietz et
al., 2013)
Other studies have examined the effects of risk-reducing institutions in online
marketplaces (Gefen & Pavlou, 2012) the imposition of threatened sanctions on reciprocity in
the trust game (Houser et al. 2008; Li et al, 2009) and performance requirements on work
motivation (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006) also finding similar patterns of effects. For example,
analogous to the u-shape of our first prior result seen in Figure 2, Falk and Kosfeld (2006)
found that imposition of a small minimum performance requirement initially decreased
workers’ performance compared to the voluntary performance demonstrated under no
requirement, however as performance requirement increased performance also increased.
As we explain below, these results, considered along with our dual program theory of
trust-based behavior regulation, lead to several predictions about effects of “assurance” on
recalibrational emotions following trust-based interactions.

C. Predictions: Patterned experience of recalibrational emotions following
trust-based interaction, and the effects of minimum return rules on
experienced emotions
1. The patterned experience of emotions. Valence Models assume two factors: one
comprised of a standard set of positive emotions that positively correlate with one another
[appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable, and
surprised], and the other comprised of a standard set of negative emotions that positively
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correlate with one another [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad,
embarrassed, ashamed, and guilty]. The Recalibrational Model specifies more than two
functionally unique sets (we suggest five, though other parsing are possible) based on shortsighted, long-sighted, interpersonal, intrapersonal, positive, and negative functions of
emotions. Valence Models assume that either negative emotion(s) are activated or positive
emotions are activated, whereas the Recalibrational Model allows for the simultaneous
activation of positive and negative emotions. Based on the standard Valence theory and the
multivariate Recalibrational theory, we tested the following predictions.
Prediction 1. Consistent with the Valence Model, PA and NA sets are strictly
interdependent with negative (= -1) correlation between them.
Prediction 2. The four factor solution (not including the factor set containing
“surprise”) proposed for the Recalibrational Model fits the data of emotional reports after
trust based interactions better than the two factor solutions that have been proposed for the
Valence Model.
2. Effects of minimum return rules on emotions. We make prediction(s), informed
by the Recalibrational model, concerning the effects of minimum return rule impositions on
emotions given two important results demonstrated by previous work: (1) that (compared to
no minimum return rule) the imposition of minimum return rules that limit Investor’s
downside risk initially reduce the rate of investment and return and, when sufficiently large,
bring the rates of investment and return back up to relatively high levels; and (2) the reduction
in risky investment and discretionary returns as imposed by minimum return rules leads to
less demonstrated trust and less demonstrated trustworthiness than otherwise observed in the
absence of the rules. Each of these results should effect the triggering of positive and negative
emotions which we hypothesize to be experienced in response to the achievements or failures
of short- and long- sighted programs across treatments.
Previous results show that the money maximizing goals of Investors’ and Trustees’
short–sighted programs were achieved most often in 0% and 30% minimum return rule
treatments, but were not achieved (i.e. amounts sent and returned were significantly less) at
such high rates in 10% and 20% treatments (see Figure 2). Most emotions in our set of 20 are
hypothesized to respond to the success and failure of the short-sighted program (i.e. negative
emotions should be experienced less intensely and positive emotions experienced more
intensely in 0% and 30% as opposed to 10% and 20% treatments), leading to the following
prediction.
Prediction 3. The set of 9 positive emotions (surprise not included) and the set of 10
negative emotions will respond to the economic trend of changing Investor and Trustee
profits as affected by investment and return levels previously reported across minimum return
rule treatments such that a curvilinear trend across treatments (0%, 10%, 20%, 30%) will be
seen. This trend should be convex for the set of all positive emotions and concave for the set
of all negative emotions.
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We also predict that emotions derived from achievement and failure of long-sighted
goals should be most active at the 0% end of our treatment spectrum where trust and
trustworthiness are most demonstrable, but least active at the 30% end of our treatment
spectrum where the demonstrability of trust and trustworthiness is most constrained. That is,
as rules are imposed and increase towards 30%, the long-sighted program’s goals become
increasingly moot – as such, the long-sighted program should not be as active, and as such
failures and successes of the long-sighted program should be less relevant (and the triggering
of any emotions serving the goals of the long-sighted program should be experienced in less
of a patterned way). Specifically, Sets 2 and 5 (the emotion sets exclusively serving the longsighted program goals) should not be experienced in a patterned way as strongly in higher
rule conditions as they are in 0%, while Sets 1 and 4 (by virtue of their service to shortsighted goals) should show strong response patterns across 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% treatments,
affected by rules effects on earnings.
Prediction 4. The curvilinear relationship between emotional responses and rule
predicted in P2 should have stronger effects for Sets 1 and 4 than for Sets 2 and 5.
Prediction 1 supports the Valence Model over the Recalibrational Model, Prediction
3 is consistent with both the Valence and Recalibrational Models, and Predictions 2 and 4
support the Recalibrational Model over the Valence Model.

D. Trust-game behaviors and emotional reports: descriptive statistics and
cross-tabulations
According to non-cooperative game theory where individuals should always prefer
more money over less, the normative (selfish) behavior expected of participants in a trust
game is for second movers (trustees) to keep all of any tripled amounts transferred by
investors, and for first movers (investors) to, therefore, not transfer any amount. Contrary to
non-cooperative game theory, we observed substantial variability in individual behavior with
many participants demonstrating trust with investment and trustworthiness with reciprocation.
Figure 4 displays the bubble plot of the amount sent and the amount returned for the 306
participants in our study. Overall, our results are consistent with previous findings of Berg et
al. (1995); on average, Investors sent $5.98 (SD=3.64) and Trustees returned $6.13
(SD=5.63), resulting in profits of $10.16 (SD=3.31) and $11.81 (SD=6.99), respectively.
Likewise, there was substantial variability in individual reports of emotional
experience. The average reported emotional experience (as a result of Trust game
interactions) had a mean of 2.19, near 2 (“a little”). Reports of experience on every emotion
ranged from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). While the modal experience
reported for most (18/20) emotions was 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) modes were also seen
at 3 for happy and 3 for content. Reports of 1 were more frequent for negative emotions than
for the positive emotions (2,006/3,060 versus 1,005/3,060, respectively), contributing to
significantly lower intensity of reported negative emotions (M=1.69, SD=0.80) than positive
emotions (M=2.68, SD=1.02) according to Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests (Z=9.227, p<.001).
The Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test indicated no differences in proportions
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of 1 reported between treatments (χ2(3)=2.997, p=.39). Likewise, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test
found no significant differences in proportions of 1 reported between any two treatments.

Amount Returned

15

10

5

0
0

5
Amount Sent

10

Figure 4: Bubble plot of amounts sent and returned in the Trust game
Note: Observations were plotted with bubbles, where the relative size indicates the number of observations. The
smallest bubble plotted represents one observation and the largest bubble plotted represents 12 observations.

Item analysis was conducted on the 20 items hypothesized to assess (10) positive and
(10) negative emotional states among our subjects. Some, but not all, positive emotions
showed positive correlation with all positive emotions (44 of 45 correlations). Some, but not
all, negative emotions showed a positive correlation with other negative emotions (41 of 45
correlations). And some, but not all, negative emotions negatively correlated with the positive
emotions (87 of 100 correlations). Guilt and surprise accounted for all positive correlations
found between negative and positive emotions. These results indicated that a single factor
solution based on valence does not provide sufficient explanatory power to understand how
individuals experienced emotions: people did not experience only positive or only negative
emotions in an exclusively valenced manner, but instead tended to experience “mixed”
positive and negative emotions simultaneously.
According to a purely “bipolar” model of valence, reports of simultaneously
experienced strong positive emotion and strong negative emotion are unexpected. However,
our results show that a strictly negative or positive activation is the exception and not the
norm. Cross tabulation indicated occurrences of simultaneously experienced PA and NA
emotions. Each participant reported 10 positive and 10 negative emotional states, yielding
100 pairs of positive and negative emotional state reports (per participant). Among all of
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these pairs of reported emotional states, we observed 130 cases from 25 (8.17% of)
participants who reported PA and NA emotions that were both felt “extremely” (=5); 522
cases from 74 (22.18% of) participants who reported PA and NA emotions that were both felt
in the range from “quite a bit” to “extremely” (≥4); 2,148 cases from 142 (46.41% of)
participants who reported PA and NA emotions that were both felt in the range from
“moderately” to “extremely” (≥3); and 5,675 cases from 220 (71.90%) participants who
reported PA and NA emotions that were both felt in the range from “a little” to “extremely”
(≥2). These cross tabulations are reported in Table 2 where they are also shown by treatment.
For every treatment, simultaneously experienced positive and negative emotions were
prevalent. Based on descriptive statistics (correlations between positive and negative
emotions, and cross tabulations), we failed to find support for Prediction 1 of the Valence
Model. Next, we report how we validated this result using inferential statistics.
Table 2. Cross tabulations of simultaneously experienced Positive and Negative
emotions by treatment
No (0%) Rule
(N=170)
Experienced:
“a little”
to
“extremely”
“moderately”
to
“extremely”
“quite a bit”
to
“extremely”
“extremely”

10% Rule
(N=48)

20% Rule
(N=40)

30% Rule
(N=48)

Combined
(N=306)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

15.6

66.5

23.4

83.3

25.7

77.5

18.1

75.0

18.5

71.9

5.7

41.8

9.3

54.2

10.8

52.5

6.2

50.0

7.0

46.4

1.4

20.6

3.2

35.4

1.7

30.0

1.5

20.8

1.7

24.2

0.3

7.6

1.0

12.5

0.0

2.5

0.5

10.4

0.4

8.2

Note: we report percentages from cross tabulation of (a) the observed frequency of all N×102 positive-negative pairs
of reports that indicated simultaneously experienced positive and negative emotions, and (2) the observed frequency
of N participants who reported simultaneously experienced positive and negative emotions.

In Table 3 we report by treatment the mean and standard deviation of average
reported emotion experienced for each of the five Recalibrational Model sets. In all
treatments we found the same pattern: participants reported more extremely experienced
positive emotions (sets 1 and 2) than negative emotions (sets 4 and 5). Additionally, in the
10% and 20% rule treatments compared to the no (0%) rule treatment, we found that
participants reported extreme experiences of positive emotions relatively less, but extreme
experiences of negative emotions relatively more.
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Table 3. Mean (Standard Deviation) of Recalibrational Model emotion sets
Treatment
No (0%) rule
N=170
10% rule
N=48
20% rule
N=40
30% rule
N=47
Total
N=305

Set 1
3.31
(1.41)
2.57
(1.22)
2.8
(1.16)
3.46
(1.12)
3.15
(1.34)

Set 2
2.64
(1.21)
2.16
(1.16)
2.54
(1.13)
2.91
(1.21)
2.6
(1.21)

Set 3
2.82
(1.43)
2.88
(1.52)
2.73
(1.26)
2.68
(1.38)
2.8
(1.41)

Set 4
1.66
(0.94)
2.08
(1.16)
1.93
(1.07)
1.59
(0.93)
1.75
(1.00)

Set 5
1.51
(0.92)
1.74
(0.89)
1.72
(0.98)
1.45
(0.71)
1.57
(0.89)

Using exploratory factor analysis, we rejected that a two-factor model fit the data
best. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 93 for a two factor model was inferior to
models with three, four, five, six, seven, and eight factors. This is true of all data from across
treatments, as well as only from the no (0%) rule treatment. Next, we used confirmatory
factor analysis to evaluate whether the four factor solution (not including the factor set
containing “surprise”) proposed for the Recalibrational Model fits the data of emotional
reports after trust-based interactions better than the two factor solution proposed for the
Valence Model.

E. Confirmatory factor analysis
William James (1890) noted that despite the intuitive impression that there are almost
countless emotions and that these emotions blend seamlessly into one another, we might yet
be able to distinguish sets of emotions “by their severally appropriate objective stimuli
[rather] than by their conscious or subjective tone” (in Plutchik, 1980, p.151). Over the past
century, theorists (e.g., Cattell, 1946; Burt, 1950; Guilford & Zimmerman, 1956; Plutchik,
1980) have explored the analysis of underlying factor sets among the multitude of proposed
emotions.
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine the fit of emotional report
data in competing models. We began with assessment of a two-factor model based on
emotion valence (i.e. positive or negative) and evaluated the fit of twenty emotions into these
two factor sets. We allowed correlation between the factors to be estimated rather than
forcing the correlation to be zero or negative. 94 The measures of fit are reported in Table
93

When fitting models, it is possible to increase the likelihood by adding parameters, but doing so may result
in overfitting. The BIC resolves this problem by introducing a penalty term for the number of parameters in the
model.
94
We also fit alternative versions of the Valence Model where we forced the correlation to -1 and zero. Allowing
the correlation to be estimated resulted in the highest fit, and thus, we compared the highest fit version of Valence
Model to our Recalibrational Model.
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4Error! Reference source not found.. The fitted measure of correlation between the factors
was -.667 [95% CI: -.736, -.597]. As such we failed to find support for P1 using CFA.
Next, we used CFA to evaluate the fit of twenty emotions into four of the five factors
corresponding to the Recalibrational Model’s functionally specific sets listed in Table
1Error! Reference source not found..95 Again we allowed correlation between the factors to
be estimated. All emotions loaded positively and significantly onto the predicted latent factor
within the Recalibrational Model at a 1% level.
According to guidelines set forth by Gefen et al. (2011), all measures of fit (i.e., loglikelihood, root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), Akaike information criterion
(AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), comparative fit index (CFI), and the
standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR)) are better for the Recalibrational Model
than the Valence Model. While the 90% CI of the RMSEA for the Recalibrational Model is
below .10 [.083, .098], it exceeds .10 [.114, .129] designating poor fit (Brown & Cudeck,
1993) for the Valence Model. The difference in better fit for the Recalibrational Model is
significant (χ2(5)=158, p<.0001), providing evidence for P2 in support of the Recalibrational
Model.
Table 4. Confirmatory Factor Analysis results
Root mean
squared error
of
approximation

Akaike
information
criterion

Bayesian
information
criterion

Comparative
fit index

Standardized
root mean
squared
residual

Model

Log
Likelihood

Degrees
of
Freedom

Valence

-7,931

58

0.12

15,978

16,194

0.83

0.09

Recalibration

-7,773

63

0.09

15,673

15,906

0.91

0.07

F. “Minimum return rule” effects on emotions
We found significant quadratic relationships between rules, rules squared, and the
positive emotions (F=7.516, p<.001, R2=.047) and rules, rules squared, and the negative
emotions (F=5.480, p=.005, R2=.035) though relatively little variance is explained. We
plotted the two sets of negative and positive emotions across rule treatments in Figure 5.
Multivariate regressions were performed using the average of individuals’ reported emotions
in each set, regressed against the rule and rule squared. The coefficients for rule and rule
squared (β=-.704, .025, respectively) were significant (both p<.001) for positive emotions and
the coefficients for rule and rule squared (β=0.497, -.018, respectively) were significant (both
p=.001) for negative emotions, providing support for P3, consistent with both Valence and
Recalibrational Models.

95

For purposes of fitting data with CFA we exclude one participant who reported “1” on all twenty emotions. We
also excluded our set 3 because it was defined by a single emotion variable (surprise). It would be misleading to
interpret the results of CFA with this set included because surprise will automatically load significantly on its factor
solution, since it is the only variable defining that factor. We also omitted the emotion surprise from the Valence
model, so that the comparison of overall fit between the two models is based on the remaining 19 emotions.
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After excluding the Recalibrational Model’s set 3 with surprise (because it
contributes to both positive and negative emotion effects above), we compared effect sizes
(adjusted R2) to evaluate the relative strength of contributions from Set 1, and Set 2 to the
above reported treatment effect on Positive emotions. We also compared effect sizes to
evaluate the relative strength of contributions from Set 4, and Set 5 to the above reported
treatment effect on Negative emotions. While the effect sizes from our quadratic regressions
were quite small, we found that the effect size of Set 1 was twice that of Set 2 and the effect
size of Set 4 was twice that of Set 5 (see Table 5). These results were consistent with
Prediction 4 in support of the Recalibrational Model.

Average of emotions in set

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0
0%

10%
20%
Minimum Return Rule
Positive emotion set

30%

Negative emotion set

Figure 5. Mean of positive and negative emotion sets per treatment
Table 5. Results of quadratic regressions for Recalibrational Model emotion sets
Quadratic
Regression
(on rule, rule2)
P value
F
Adjusted R

2

Set 1
0.000

Set 2
0.012

Set 3
0.772

Set 4
0.013

Set 5
0.121

F=8.478
0.053

F=4.517
0.029

F=0.259
0.002

F=4.428
0.029

F=2.131
0.014

Note: Multivariate regressions were performed using the average of individuals’ reported emotions in each set,
regressed against the rule and rule-squared.
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IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION
A. Discussion of results
After having reviewed the history of thought on the relationships between emotions’
valence, hedonism, and utility we introduced a recalibrational theory of emotions with
specific attention to how emotions are involved in the regulation of trust-based behaviors. We
proposed specific “recalibrational” features for each of 20 emotions (i.e., assisting in shortsighted goal pursuit, long-sighted goal pursuit, interpersonal recalibration, intrapersonal
recalibration, upregulation or homeostatic maintenance or downregulation) commonly used in
PANAS scales and with which we surveyed participants concerning their emotional states
after (and as a consequence of) anonymously interacting in a Trust game.
We have evaluated the reported experience of 20 emotions, comparing the usefulness
and interpretability of either simpler Valence Models (commonly applied to the SAM or
PANAS) or the multidimensional model (based on recalibrational theory) that we proposed
for understanding emotional experience and trust-based interaction behavior. Both crosstabulation of simultaneously experienced positive and negative emotions and factor analysis
demonstrated that the multidimensional Recalibrational Model describes the patterned
experience of a large set of emotions following trust based interaction better than the standard
Valence Model. Below we discuss these results and their implications for emotion and trust
research, consider applications of the insights revealed by this line of research, and finally
mention several areas of trust and emotion research in need of further investigation that we
feel could offer assistance to the development of both personal and business relationships.
When we used regression to evaluate whether our experimental manipulations (via
imposition of minimum return rules) of trust and trustworthiness demonstrability affected the
emotional reports we gathered after trust games, we found evidence for a clearly valenced
response – with positive and negative sets of the Valence Model responding in a mirrored,
almost symmetrically opposite fashion. This valenced response suggests that a model based
on the positive and negative clustering of emotional experiences (recognized for millennia by
respected scholars and informing the standard models used today) offers intuitive explanatory
power for understanding trust-based interactions. Despite the attractive simplicity of
considering only two factors with the Valence Model additional factors clearly lie latent.
Further evaluation of Set 1, Set, 2, Set 4, and Set 5 (from the Recalibrational Model)
–subsets of the larger clusters of positive and negative emotions considered by the Valence
Model—suggested to us that our experimental impositions of minimum return rules did not
proportionally effect all sets of the Recalibrational Model the same: some of the sets of our
model account for a greater portion of the valenced effect revealed by the simpler Valence
Model. Specifically, the effects of demonstrability constraints (imposed by minimum return
rules in our experiment) on Sets 2 and 5 of the Recalibrational Model are not as large as those
on Sets 1 and 4.
Recalibrational Model Sets 1 and 2, (positive emotions which upregulate or maintain
homeostasis of targeted programs) are basically components of the “positive affect set” of the
PANAS. Likewise, Recalibrational Model Sets 4 and 5 (negative emotions which
downregulate targeted programs) are components of the “negative affect set” of the PANAS.
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Among all the sets affected by the rules treatments, Sets 2 and 5 show comparatively smaller
effects. We attribute the smaller effect sizes of Sets 2 and 5 to their unique and distinguishing
recalibrational feature: they are made up of social emotions exclusively assisting in longsighted goal pursuit and, thus, concerned more specifically with behaviors demonstrating trust
and trustworthiness than with behaviors producing profit. Set 3 (surprise), is an interloper
between positive and negative emotion sets (it can serve either function). Incidentally, Set 3
does not show a significant relationship with the minimum return rule imposed (as do the
other sets). We suspect that other emotions (reacting to the accuracy of prior beliefs, given a
subsequently discovered state of nature) like confusion, bewilderment, amazement, and
astonishment would also cluster best with surprise in Set 3 – a “misfit” set that does not
cleanly fit the Valence Model. Because each of the sets specified by the Recalibrational
Model serves a unique suite of functional features, collapsing these sets into a simple two
factor “positive affect” and “negative affect” Valence Model hides these more nuanced
recalibrational features and ignores their experience.
As we reviewed above, the standard social science paradigm for studying the
patterned experience of emotions tends to survey participants using an instrument (e.g.
PANAS, SAM) ultimately understood according to the Valence Model. Some of the larger
formulations of the PANAS contain enough variety in terms of the different emotional state
items they survey, such that they can be interpreted by the more complex multivariate
Recalibrational Model which we have discussed. On the other hand, bipolar affect scale
instruments such as the SAM preclude the measure of mixed emotional states (with
simultaneous experience of both positively and negatively valenced emotions) or emotional
states that are not exclusively positive or negative. We find it especially disconcerting,
therefore, that many psychophysiologists, neuroscientists, behavioral economists, and
decision scientists have used and continue to use overly simplistic bipolar affect scales. We
suggest that researchers either utilize emotional surveys with large arrays of items that can be
interpreted by multivariate models of emotion, or else construct their surveys based on the
Recalibrational Model of emotions discussed in this chapter. Elsewhere (Schniter et al.,
2013), we have suggested based on supporting evidence, that the emotional states
appreciative, happy, proud, frustrated, angry, and guilty make up a set with balanced valence
that is mostly representative of the functional categories covered by the Recalibrational
Model. Emotion sets representative of the Recalibrational Model’s functional features (i.e.,
based on short-sighted, long-sighted, positive, negative, interpersonal and intrapersonal
functions) could be used in producing an appropriate survey instrument with sensitivity to the
variety of emotional responses triggered after trust-based interactions.
That our CFA results (for both the Recalibrational and Valence models) were not
stronger is a feature of this data that we would like to call attention to. As we reported in our
descriptive statistics section, analysis of emotion reports revealed a “floor effect” 96 with many
96

Hessling et al (2004, Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods) explain, “A floor effect occurs
when a measure possesses a distinct lower limit for potential responses and a large concentration of participants
score at or near this limit... Scale attenuation is a methodological problem that occurs whenever variance is
restricted in this manner.”
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values of 1 reported, consistent with either (i) a problem interpreting emotion labels, (ii)
difficulty identifying and reporting emotional states, or (iii) inactivation of emotions in the
studied context. Indeed, because of the many 1s reported for both positive and negative
emotional states across our treatments, we conclude that it may not be possible to get much
stronger results using data generated from self-reports of emotional states based on Likert
scales. Acknowledging this shortcoming, we discuss the promise of future work based on
objective coding of facial expressions of emotions below.

B. Insights and applications of trust and emotion research
The cornerstones of our Recalibrational Model are the competing behavior regulation
programs theorized to affect self-control and trust-based behavior propensities in self and
others. The recalibrational emotions we have described target and attempt to regulate these
short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs. A better understanding of these
fundamental components behind one’s own inner conflict under choice dilemmas, and the
role of emotions in calibrating the regulation of behavior when faced with dilemmas, can
contribute to the cultivation of wisdom and self-control (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995;
Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006; Gómez-Miñambres & Schniter, 2013). However, wisdom and
self-control have never been easy for humans to attain. The proposition that our minds
contain simultaneously active conflicted programs, and produce contradictory emotional
states (such as those bearing mixes of strong simultaneous experience of positive and
negative emotions – e.g. pride and guilt) is not agreeably reconciled with most peoples’
preferred concept of “self”. Rather, it appears to us that many find it preferable to think of
themselves as having a singular mind (a singular “self”) without inner conflict, and thus
prefer thinking that when they experience milieus of emotional states, that these sets of
feelings are either clearly positive or negative. The experience of conflicted mixed emotions
may not be regarded as a reliable steady state of human experience because it challenges our
intuitions of a “self’s” singular internal interests and the consonance of a non-contradictory
self-representation generally attributed to a sane mind. Expounding on the existential crisis
created by an inherently incomplete awareness of self and selves, Kurzban (2010, p.56)
suggests,
“if it’s true that your brain consists of many, many little modules with various functions, and if
only a small number of them are conscious, then there might not be any particular reason to
consider some of them to be “you” or “really you” or your “self”... And for that matter, there
might be no particular reason to consider your intuitions about your choices, or your ability to
know your “self” reliably.”

As we have reviewed, social dilemmas and behaviors engaged in social dilemmas
often invoke social emotions like anger, disgust, guilt, embarrassment, pride, appreciation,
and a feeling of being believable. Despite some of these emotions being aversive and
considered as “flaws” of human nature, they are hypothesized to encourage individuals
towards redressing or abandoning uncooperative relationships, or towards engaging in more
cooperation. Evidence of predicted instantiation of these recalibrational emotions’ in
laboratory-based experimental economic games helps us explain why humans, in these
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conditions, are regularly observed producing trusting, trustworthy, and cooperative behaviors
(Johnson et al., 2003).
Furthermore, with a better understanding of the predictable nature of recalibrational
emotions triggered in the wake of trust-based interaction, the ability to better predict others’
subsequent behavior (based on an understanding of their conflicted minds and the
recalibrational function of emotions) could enhance discriminative cooperation. Judgment
about others’ behavioral propensities, based on their emotional states, is something that
comes intuitively and automatically to non-trained lay-people through personable face-to-face
interactions. Willis and Todorov (2006) reported that with only one hundred milliseconds of
exposure to neutral faces, observers form impressions of facial trustworthiness. Magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) has shown that this unconscious and automatic judgment process
is made in the amygdala (Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007).
A select minority (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1999; O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004), or –
perhaps- most people (Belot, Bhaskar, & Van De Ven, 2012) may be “naturals” capable of
detecting liars. Belot et al. (2012) showed that observers of contestants on a game show
playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma were able to distinguish truth from lies when the contestants
were asked about their intentions by the game show host. Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993)
showed that, after half an hour of social interaction with the other player in a one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma, participants were able to predict with above-chance accuracy if the other
would cooperate or defect.
The ability to “read” other people and gain insight into their behavioral propensities
can also be developed further via the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) first developed
for training purposes by Ekman and Friesen (1978). This skill of detecting and documenting
“action movements” in face muscles, eyes, and posture is now taught in certified courses as
an accredited skill. The reading of facial expressions has also been used in conjunction with
lie-detection procedures for forensic applications (Kassin & Fong, 1999).
Research conducted on emotions, cooperation, and relationship maintenance suggests
that improvements to cooperative relationships can result with the ability to express emotions
(e.g., Xiao & Houser, 2005), the acquired abilities to both recognize emotional states in self
and others, and with an understanding of the functional designs behind these emotional states
(to encourage specific behavioral propensities). Perhaps the reason that the ability to detect
emotions is most useful is because involuntary facial expressions possess signaling quality
affecting relationships (Boone & Buck, 2003; Brown & Moore, 2002; Frank, 1998;
Krumhuber et al., 2007; Mehu, Little, & Dunbar, 2007; Oda et al., 2009; Trivers, 1971;
Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001; Schug et al., 2010). As such, emotions
provide reasonably reliable and useful information (Keltner & Kring, 1998) about one’s
intentions to forgive, compensate, reciprocate, retaliate against, profit from, leave or exclude
other group members in a social dilemma. For example, Chapman et al. (2009) found that the
participants in the Ultimatum game who expressed more disgust (in response to proposals)
with their leviator labii (the muscle which raises the upper lip to form the classic facial
expression of disgust), were more likely to reject those offers. This result suggests that
disgust can signal an aversion to unfairness.
When the display of emotional expression is purposefully controlled and emotional
states deliberately communicated, verbal contracts can be strengthened. Without the addition
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of reliable signals as guarantees, verbal contract are “cheap” and can easily be used for
deception. Words do not reliably reflect underlying behavioral propensities or commitments
in the way that emotions do (Boone & Buck, 2003; Buck, 1985). This is because many facial
expressions of negative emotion can be difficult to intentionally falsify (Ekman, 2003;
Ekman, Roper, & Hager, 1980; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Remarkably, and probably
because our psychologies that consider emotional expressions unfalsifiable and reliable
evolved to do so in a time before computer graphics and virtual communication, people also
respond to contrived emotional expressions (e.g., emoticons) as well as induced memories of
past emotional states. Stouten and De Cremer (2010) found that sending pictures with happy
and angry displays moderated the effect of communicated intentions to cooperate or defect.
Ketelaar & Au (2003) reported that participants who recalled an episode of guilt as opposed
to a neutral event cooperated more in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma (Ketelaar & Au, 2003).

C. Important directions for further research
The results of research reported in this chapter concern the predictable patterns of
self-reported emotional experience following trust based interaction. Here we would like to
note the items prioritized on our “wish list” of further research that we hope to see conducted.
First, we would like to see evidence of whether facial expressions of emotion
following trust based interactions are predictable as self-reports of experienced emotions. If
they cannot be as readily falsified or misreported, facial expressions might provide more
objective measures of participants’ emotional states than self-reports.
While we have developed a theory of emotions’ ultimate functions (i.e., what the
mechanisms were selected to do) and derived predictions from our conjectures about those
(recalibrational) functions, this study only tested the patterned reporting of how emotions are
experienced after interacting with another person anonymously in a particular situation.
Future studies can take the Recalibrational Model one step further and test for emotions’
ultimate functions. By examining whether the future actions of those individuals who report
specific emotions, or show specific facial expressions are affected, we can evaluate what
behavioral propensities emotional experiences affect. We would also like to see evidence of
whether third party observers are more likely to predict the repeat behaviors of participants in
an iterated social dilemma interaction (e.g. the Trust game or Prisoner’s Dilemma), given the
opportunity to observe the facial expressions produced by those participants upon learning of
the outcome of their previous interaction.
Last, we would like to see results from studies investigating whether, with training to
detect others’ facial expressions of emotions and interpret emotions’ functional designs, third
parties’ ability to predict others’ behavioral propensities can be substantially improved. With
an understanding of the behavior regulation systems and their emotional orchestrators guiding
personal and business relationships, and perhaps with an understanding of the facial
expressions signaling people’s emotional states, greater wellbeing and economic welfare can
be achieved. We hope that our model and suggestions for future work provide a step in the
direction of developing better understanding of the human condition. We optimistically look
forward to a future where people can better understand the role that emotions play in trustbased behavior.
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